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ABSTRACT 
 
 
POLITICAL CULTURE, POLICY LIBERALISM, AND THE STRENGTH OF 
JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE IN THE STATES 
 
by 
 
Casey Carmody 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor David Pritchard 
 
 
 
 
This study examined the relationships between the strength of states’ journalist’s 
privileges and state characteristics. The state characteristics included political culture and 
policy liberalism. The study created an index to identify and score several important 
components of journalist’s privilege in each state. The various components included the 
legal source of the privilege, when journalists could use the privilege, what types of 
information the privilege protected, and who could invoke the privilege. The study then 
used statistical tests to test the relationships between state characteristics and privilege 
strength. The results indicated that policy liberalism was a significant predictor of a 
state’s journalist’s privilege strength. Political culture was not related to privilege 
strength. In a larger context, the study’s results added evidence to a larger trend that 
policy liberalism influences state media law. The results also found that several states 
limited journalist’s privilege to traditional journalists.  Only a small number of states 
have extended the privilege to non-traditional journalists, such as Internet journalists and 
book authors. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 The definitions of who exactly is a journalist are a mess. Some definitions are 
limited to traditional newsgatherers such as newspaper and television journalists. Others 
claim that “we’re all journalists now” because technological advancements have made 
self-publishing easier than ever.
1
 An internet search of “who is a journalist” leads down 
an endless rabbit hole of debate and discussion.  The idea of who qualifies as a journalist 
has ranged from traditional reporters
2
 to lonely pamphleteers
3
 to online bloggers
4
 to 
Internet publishers of classified documents
5
 with many definitions in between. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has refused to establish a definition of a journalist on multiple occasions.
6
 
A clear designation of who can be considered a journalist has not emerged. Granted, the 
discussion is not entirely new.
7
 It has merely intensified in a world where publishing has 
become more convenient.
8
  
 The importance of the definitions of journalists cannot be understated. In the 
United States, the press has several privileges that other citizens do not enjoy.
9
 One 
privilege is a journalist’s privilege to keep information about sources confidential. Most 
                                                     
1
 See SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRESS AND RESHAPING 
OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE (2007). 
2
 STANLEY JOHNSON & JULIAN HARRISS, THE COMPLETE REPORTER 3-8 (1942).  
3
 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  
4
 O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
5
 Scott Gant, “Why Julian Assange is a Journalist,” SALON, Dec. 20, 2010, 
http://www.salon.com/2010/12/20/wikileaks_gant_journalism/. 
6
 See Branzburg, supra note 3, at 704; Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 
927-928 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
7
 See Branzburg, supra note 3, at 704.  
8
 See Citizens United, supra note 6; Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of 
Journalism to Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
1371 (2003); Erik Ugland & Jennifer Henderson, Who is a Journalist and Why Does it Matter? 
Disentangling the Legal and Ethical Arguments, 22 J. OF MASS MEDIA ETHICS 241 (2007); Mary-Rose 
Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515 (2007); Sharon Docter, 
Blogging and Journalism: Extending Shield Law Protection to New Media Forms, 54 J. OF BROADCASTING 
& ELECTRONIC MEDIA 588 (2010). 
9
 GANT, supra note 1, at 87. 
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states have enacted shield statutes to give journalists this privilege that non-journalists do 
not receive. Shield statutes grant journalists a privilege from testifying about their news 
sources in state courts or before state agencies.
10
 In several states that have not enacted 
shield statutes, state courts have decided that journalists are granted immunity through 
existing legislation or state constitutions.
11
  
 Many journalists argue that these privileges are essential to the free flow of 
information. Journalists suggest that confidential sources of important information will 
dry up if authorities require journalists to expose the sources’ identities. The result of few 
sources is that less information can be given to citizens. Without information, citizens do 
not have the ability to effectively participate in democracy. Therefore, many journalists 
maintain that the protection of sources is crucial to a well-functioning democracy. This 
concept would also suggest that states with broad protections established through shield 
statutes have greater democratic participation than in states without shield statutes.  
 The nature of journalist’s privilege lies at the heart of this study. This study adds 
to the existing literature about journalist’s privilege in several important ways. This thesis 
advances theory that a particular state characteristic influences media law. It adds to 
discussions about the nature of federalism through the differences in state laws. This 
study contributes to the understanding of how different states protect journalists, whether 
it is based on who they work for or whether the person is engaged in news gathering and 
disseminating. This thesis examines the ways in which states have been willing to make 
                                                     
10
 PAUL SIEGEL, COMMUNICATION LAW IN AMERICA 7 (2d ed. 2008). 
11
 Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress: Journalists' Privilege to Withhold Information in 
Judicial and Other Proceedings: State Shield Statutes, No. RL32806 (June 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL32806.pdf.  
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clear definitions of journalists, which can ultimately lead to more First Amendment rights 
for journalists that other citizens do not receive.  
 A prior study into media law posited that the liberalism of a state’s policies 
influences state media law.
12
 States with more liberal policies tend to have laws that are 
more favorable to journalists. Few studies have aimed to test this theory, though. No 
studies have examined whether a state’s policy liberalism can affect the law of 
journalist’s privilege. Previous research on journalist’s privilege has simply focused on 
press subpoenas or the textual analysis of shield statutes. This study, in contrast, uses 
content analysis to identify key provisions of states’ journalist’s privilege protections. 
The data are compared to specific state characteristics to see the influence on the state’s 
media laws. The examination of the state characteristics and state journalist’s privilege 
protections fills a gap in the literature of the understanding of the privilege. 
 This study’s focus on state law is important to the basic understanding of the 
American system of federalism. As Justice Louis Brandeis once said, “It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”13 It is under this theory that states have held different views on 
press protection even with the First Amendment of the Constitution stating “Congress 
shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”14 The Fourteenth 
Amendment
15
 requires that states must respect the First Amendment’s guarantees at a 
                                                     
12
 David Pritchard & Neil Nemeth, Predicting the Content of State Public Record Laws, NEWSPAPER RES. 
J., Fall 1989. 
13
 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).  
14
 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
15
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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minimum,
16
 but states can establish broader protections for the press than the First 
Amendment requires. Although states take cues from one another,
17
 states have not 
followed a particularly uniform approach to establishing shield protections for journalists. 
States have independently made decisions on how to approach press privileges. This 
study looks to explain whether some state characteristics explain differences in state 
media law. Identifications of the characteristics also provide a framework to understand 
the development of state law. Several factors can play a role in the way legislation is 
developed, shaped, and passed into law. Ultimately, the study can provide more insight 
into the understanding of the American federalism system. 
 The study is important in that it focuses on the different ways that states have 
decided to provide protections to journalists. Some states provide journalist’s privilege 
protections to journalists based on who is their employer. Other states provide protections 
based on whether a person is involved in journalistic activities. The distinctions are very 
important because of Internet self-publishing. Citizen journalists have more opportunities 
than ever before to gather and disseminate news. States are beginning to grapple with the 
idea that these types of journalists may deserve protections even though they do not work 
for traditional media outlets. 
 This study’s examination of how states define journalists is crucial to the current 
state of journalism. States that recognize journalist’s privilege inherently define that some 
people are journalists while others are not. Such designations can be problematic. 
Essentially, the clear definitions can create different levels of First Amendment privileges 
for different citizens. Journalists receive more First Amendment privileges than non-
                                                     
16
 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).  
17
 ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES 3 
(2007). 
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journalists. The problem has often been the reason that the Supreme Court is hesitant to 
create a definition of journalists. The accessibility of Internet publishing only compounds 
the problem. The modern-day lonely pamphleteers no longer stand on the street corner to 
disseminate their message. The pamphleteers now publish online through blogs and 
discussion forums. The clear-line definitions of a journalist in state law has the potential 
to become troublesome when people can publish information easily online. 
Overall, this study seeks to add to the discussion of whether state characteristics 
influence media law. The study also looks to provide explanations of who might be 
considered a journalist for the purposes of special press privileges. More specifically, the 
study seeks to discover whether non-traditional journalists, such as bloggers or Internet 
publishers, enjoy the privileges that state governments have granted to traditional 
journalists. With the continuing advancement of Internet self-publishing and citizen 
journalism, questions about who exactly is a journalist become all the more difficult.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
A Federalism System 
 State governance differs in the United States because of federalism. Federalism is 
a system of government in which authority is divided among multiple realms. Each realm 
maintains its own autonomy, but the possibility remains for the realms to work 
cooperatively.
18
 In the United States, this authority is shared between the federal 
government and state governments. This system of shared authority is established 
through the United States Constitution, which establishes specific powers for the federal 
government and reserves certain roles for the states. States are granted equal 
representation in the Senate, play a prominent role in the selection of the president, 
approve constitutional amendments, and have guarantees of maintaining their own 
government.
19
  
 Through the maintenance of their own governments, states govern over most 
Americans’ everyday activities within constitutional limits. States have the power to 
regulate taxes, criminal law, education, the creation of local governments, capital 
punishment, and social issues, such as gay marriage and abortion requirements.
20
 With 
the various issues to tackle, states approach public policy from many different angles. 
Unsurprisingly, laws and policies on similar issues can widely vary from state to state. 
 It is important to note that states do not always act independently of each other, 
though. In fact, the opposite can happen. Policy diffusion occurs when state decision 
makers look to other states to imitate policy innovation.
21
 Even with states taking cues 
                                                     
18
 KYLE SCOTT, FEDERALISM: NORMATIVE THEORY AND ITS PRACTICAL RELEVANCE 1 (2011).  
19
 DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, FEDERALISM AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA 2 (2012). 
20
 Id. at 31.  
21
 KARCH, supra note 17, at 3.  
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from other states, variations are still likely to develop. Many factors can cause these 
differences. Two particular characteristics that create these differences are political 
culture and policy liberalism.   
State Political Culture 
 In his study of American federalism, Elazar noted that states had varying political 
cultures. Elazar defined political culture as “the particular pattern of orientation to 
political action in which each political system is imbedded.”22 Essentially, political 
culture plays a significant role in the way a state’s political system operates. Elazar 
suggested that three main aspects influence a state’s political culture. The first aspect was 
the perceptions of what politics is and what is expected of government. The second was 
the type of people who are active in politics and serve as officials. The final aspect was 
the way citizens, politicians and government officials actually take part in practicing 
government according to their perceptions.
23
  
 Elazar’s examination of these characteristics led him to conclude that states can 
fall into one of three distinct political cultures. Although some states had mixed cultures, 
Elazar found a dominant culture in each state. The first political culture is individualistic. 
In states with individualistic cultures, government is viewed in mostly economic terms. 
Government must be limited and encourage private initiatives. The government also 
should aim to expand access to the marketplace. The people involved in government view 
politics as a way to advance both socially and economically. Party loyalty is very 
important because the political system relies on mutual obligations within parties rather 
                                                     
22
 DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 109 (3d ed. 1984).  
23
 Id., at 112.  
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than a focus on issues. Often, government official corruption is high, but it is also widely 
accepted.
24
   
 The second political culture is moralistic. In states with moralistic cultures, 
politics is viewed as a way to improve society. The goal of the government is to promote 
the public good. When involved with politics and government, people don’t view the 
involvement as a means to advance economically. Rather, government service is viewed 
as public service. Party loyalties are not strong in moralistic cultures. The importance of 
issues and public good outweigh loyalties to a specific party. Politics is considered to be 
the concern of every citizen. There are fewer career politicians. Political corruption is 
also very low.
25
 
 The final political culture is traditionalistic. For states with traditionalistic 
cultures, politics and government maintain existing societal hierarchies and structures. 
Paternalism and elitism are valued in this political culture. People who serve in 
government often come from the social elite or have long-standing family ties to 
governing. These ties are of the utmost importance because value is placed on these ties 
rather than political party allegiance. People who are not part of the existing political 
system are not encouraged to become involved in politics.
26
 
 Elazar’s political culture typology has held up over time. One criticism of 
Elazar’s classifications was that it did not rely on statistical procedures or empirical data 
to determine his cultures.
27
 The critical study did find that Elazar’s typologies were as an 
effective predictive tool as the study’s statistically created regional subcultures. Both 
                                                     
24
 Id. at 115-117. 
25
 Id. at 117-118.  
26
 Id. at 118-119.  
27
 Joel Lieske, Regional Subcultures of the United States, 55 THE J. OF POL. 888, 889 (1993). 
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cultural measures were similar in predicting habitual political behavior and political 
behavior that is arranged according to state-party lines.
28
 Other studies have also found 
that Elazar’s typologies remain an effective way to explain variations in policies among 
states.
29
 Political culture also remains an enduring trait of states because Elazar based it 
on migration patterns.
30
 
Policy Liberalism 
 Distinct from political culture, policy liberalism is a state’s tendency to foster the 
social and civic lives of its citizens. Liberalism should not be understood in its classical 
definition. The term is used in its modern American connotation. It is a term that 
describes the ideological orientations of a state’s policies. States with higher levels of 
policy liberalism tend to spend more public money on social welfare programs 
underprivileged residents. High policy liberalism states tend to use the government to 
place more regulations on businesses than states with low levels of policy liberalism. 
States with high policy liberalism also hold more expansive views on civil rights and 
voter protections. It is important to note that policy liberalism is not intended to label 
policies as good or bad. Rather, it is merely a descriptive term that suggests what type of 
ideological viewpoints might favor the particular types of policy. 
                                                     
28
 Id., at 908-909. 
29
 See Steven G. Koven & Christopher Mausolff, The Influence of Political Culture on State Budgets: 
Another Look at Elazar’s Formulation, 32 Am. Rev. of Pub. Admin. 66, 74 (2002). A state’s budget 
expenditures vary depending on its type of political culture; Lawrence M. Mead, State Political Culture 
and Welfare Reform, 32 THE POL’Y. STUD. J. 271, 286 (2004). Moralistic states were most successful at 
welfare reform. The author states successful reform is the process as well as a state avoiding political and 
administrative problems; Patrick Fisher, State Political Culture and Support for Obama in the 2008 
Democratic Presidential Primaries, 47 SOC. SCI. J. 699, 708 (2010). Political culture was correlated with 
support for Barack Obama during the 2008 primaries; David A. Tandberg & Erik C. Ness, State Capital 
Expenditures for Higher Education: “Where the Real Politics Happens,” 36 J. OF  EDUC. FIN. 394, 411 
(2011). Political culture was a significant predictor of state capital expenditures on higher education. 
30
 ELAZAR, supra note 22, at 122.  
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Klingman and Lammers’ examination of several different policies indicated that 
states differ in the tendency of public sector use.
31
  The policies they examined were 
associated with liberal positions in American politics, thus creating the label of “general 
policy liberalism.”   Klingman and Lammers concluded that policy liberalism was an 
enduring trait of states and was dependent on multiple factors. The factors include 
socioeconomic and political structures of the state, the state’s society, and the state’s 
political structure.
32
 
 Subsequent research on policy liberalism has indicated that it develops from 
public opinion. Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s research suggested that public opinion was 
the strongest indicator of state policy. They found very strong correlations between the 
ideology of public opinion and the ideological approach of state policies. Erikson, Wright 
and McIver also suggested that socioeconomic variables were not significantly related to 
policy liberalism. They found that when public opinion was omitted from analysis, 
socioeconomic factors had a significant influence.
33
 The likely explanation for this 
finding is that public opinion is a mediator between socioeconomic variables and policy 
liberalism. Subsequent research has also indicated that public opinion is more important 
in predicting policy liberalism than the influence of organized interests
34
 or the use of 
ballot initiatives.
35
 
                                                     
31
 David Klingman & William W. Lammers, The ‘General Policy Liberalism’ Factor in American State 
Politics, 28 AM. JOUR. OF POL. SCI. 598, 600 (1984). 
32
 Id., at 608.  
33
 ROBERT S. ERIKSON ET AL., STATEHOUSE DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY IN THE AMERICAN 
STATES 78-86 (1993). 
34
 Virginia Gray et al., Public Opinion, Public Policy, and Organized Interests in the American States, 57 
POL. RES. Q. 411, 419 (2004). 
35
 James Monogan et al., Public Opinion, Organized Interests, and Policy Congruence in Initiative and 
Noninitiative U.S. States, 9 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 304, 319 (2009).  
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 Additionally, policy liberalism is associated with a variety of different liberal 
policies. Various indicators that are not overtly ideological can include issues such as 
education spending, the extension of Medicaid eligibility beyond minimal federal 
regulations, and consumer protections.
36
 Other indicators have much clearer partisan 
divides. These indicators include gun regulation, abortion issues, and tax progressivity.
37
 
Overall, these different types of issues can be used to determine the general policy 
liberalism of a state.  
A Basis for Journalist’s Privilege 
 The underlying rationale for the First Amendment is that free expression is crucial 
to a functioning democracy.
38
 Many journalists have maintained that the First 
Amendment’s guarantees of free expression include a journalist’s privilege.39 Some First 
Amendment theorists have agreed with this idea. Particularly, Vincent Blasi has 
suggested that courts should recognize that the First Amendment protects journalist’s 
confidential sources.    
 Blasi explained that First Amendment theories established three rationales to 
justify the freedom of expression.
40
 The rationales included individual autonomy, 
diversity, and self-government.
41
 The individual autonomy rationale suggested that an 
uninhibited flow of information allowed individuals to develop personal beliefs.
42
 The 
diversity rationale rested on the principle that diverse ideas and opinions are good for a 
                                                     
36
 Erikson et al., supra note 33, at 75.  
37
 Gray et al., supra note 34, at 415.  
38
 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). 
39
 Garland v. Torre, 259. F.2d 545 (2nd Cir. 1958). 
40
 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 524 
(1977). 
41
 Id., at 524. 
42
 Id., at 544.  
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society.
43
 The self-government rationale was based on the idea that citizens need 
information to make choices about their government.
44
 The rationales were not 
independently unique from each other.
45
 Each rationale also primarily focused on the 
freedom of speech.  
 Blasi suggested that First Amendment theory should include a fourth rationale 
that was specific to the press. He called the additional rationale the checking value. The 
checking value is the idea that freedom of expression is crucial because it checks the 
abuse of governmental power.
46
 Blasi argued that this rationale should create protections 
specifically for the press. A strong institutional press could check the power of large 
corporations and governmental institutions.
47
 One specific protection Blasi suggested was 
the protection of newsgatherers from subpoenas requesting information about 
confidential sources.
48
 A journalist’s sources could be the subject of punishment from the 
exposed power abusers. Therefore, the checking power of the press needed to place high 
value on the protection of journalists’ confidential sources who expose corruption to the 
public.
49
 
Blasi’s ideas of the value of checking the abuse of power was not new. Historic 
discussions of a free press have often focused on a checking value. Andrew Hamilton, 
serving as defense attorney in the famous libel case against John Peter Zenger, argued 
that people had the right to expose and oppose the abuse of official power through the 
                                                     
43
 Id., at 549-550.  
44
 Id., at 554-555.  
45
 Id., at 565.  
46
 Id., at 527.  
47
 Id., at 541. 
48
 Id., at 605.  
49
 Id., at 603.  
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press.
50
 In his opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, James Madison argued 
that the press’ role was to have a critical eye on the government.51 Alexis de Tocqueville 
suggested that press freedom was the only way to protect citizens from government 
agents who violated the law.
52
   More recent discussions of a free press have also noted a 
checking function. Former Justice Potter Stewart suggested that the purpose of a 
constitutional guarantee for a free press was to create a fourth branch of government. A 
free press was an additional check on the three branches of government.
53
 Baker 
suggested a free press plays an important role in checking governmental and corporate 
power.
54
  
The checking value of the press provides a strong argument for journalist’s 
privilege. Confidential sources who expose the corruption of power provides information 
to citizens so they can make informed decisions. In fact, the checking value of the press 
was invoked in one of the press’ greatest victories at the Supreme Court. Former Justice 
Hugo Black’s concurring opinion in New York Times Co. v. United States55 stated that the 
press was protected specifically so it could inform citizens of government wrongdoings.
56
 
This important role for the press should not be understated. 
Journalist’s privilege can certainly have drawbacks, though. Journalist’s privilege 
can create significant legal problems. The privilege can conflict with a criminal 
                                                     
50
 See a reprint of the famous case in The Trial of John Peter Zenger, in THREE TRIALS: ZENGER, 
WOODFALL & LAMBERT: 1765-1794 46 (Stephen Parks ed., 1974).  
51
 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, January 7, 1800, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON (Ralph Ketcham ed. 2006). 
52
 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 211 (Gerald E. Bevan trans., 2003).  
53
 Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631, 708 (1975). 
54
 C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 132-134 (2002).  
55
 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).  
56
 Id., at 717.  
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defendant’s constitutional rights.57 The protection of confidential sources can also 
prevent all of the facts coming to light in civil litigation. Journalists who invoke a 
journalist’s privilege and refuse to reveal the names of confidential sources could 
potentially prevent justice.
58
 
An example of such a situation was Judith Miller’s protection of a source who 
leaked the name of C.I.A. operative Valerie Plame. The confidential source, later 
identified as Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, gave 
Miller information about Plame as a way to strike back at Plame’s husband. Her husband 
had been critical of statements that President George Bush had made about Iraq’s 
attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction. The disclosure of a covert C.I.A. 
operative is a violation of federal law. When Miller was called to testify before a federal 
grand jury, she refused to provide information. As a result, she was found in contempt 
and jailed. Miller appealed, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit refused to 
grant Miller’s release. Eventually, Libby released Miller from their confidentiality 
agreement. Miller testified before the grand jury after spending 85 days in jail.
59
 
 Although Miller’s source was eventually identified, the case highlighted multiple 
problems that could arise when a journalist refuses to identify a confidential source. The 
revelation of Plame’s status as an undercover operative could have put her and perhaps 
other C.I.A. operatives in danger. The government was delayed from moving forward 
with an investigation into a clear violation of law. Plame was prevented from learning 
who derailed her career. The fact that Miller refused to name her source for so long also 
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did not result in a free flow of information. Rather, Miller’s belief in journalist’s privilege 
hindered the public from learning which government official was unlawfully releasing 
information.
60
 Journalists often laud the protection of confidential sources as noble. In 
reality, a journalist’s protection of a source can have several negative consequences.  
Journalists and Confidential Sources 
 Journalists use sources, people with direct knowledge of the information being 
reported, to provide insight on subjects.
61
 Effective journalism practice typically requires 
a reporter to fully disclose the name and pertinent information about a source. Full 
disclosure makes a journalist’s reporting reliable, believable and verifiable.62 At times, 
though, some sources will only provide information if journalists make a promise of 
confidentiality.
63
 Journalists will make such a promise so that more information can be 
provided to citizens.
64
 
Confidential sources come in several different types. Accusers hide behind the 
cloak of confidentiality to make accusations about another person. Tipsters direct 
journalists to important, unknown information. The stigmatized sources could face public 
ridicule because they reveal potentially embarrassing information about themselves. 
Explainers provide background information about the inner-workings of government or 
corporations. Informants expose governmental and corporate abuses of power. Typically, 
the informant is the type of source that a journalist’s privilege aims to protect. As Blasi 
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suggested, confidential sources who expose the abuse of power are the people that need 
the most protection.
65
 
Unsurprisingly, surveys have shown journalists most often use confidential 
sources to report on governmental affairs, crime and politics.
66
 Although state and federal 
whistleblower statutes provide some protection, government officials can still threaten 
sources. This situation is especially evident with White House administrations increasing 
the use of the Espionage Act to prosecute information leaks.
67
  The federal and state 
governments have increased the use of subpoenas to gain information from news 
organizations in both criminal and civil proceedings.
68
 These governments have also 
increased the number of subpoenas seeking information that journalists gained from 
sources in confidence.
69
  
The use of confidential sources is widespread, although it appears to be declining. 
A 1971 survey of journalists indicated that journalists relied on confidential sources in 
about 20 percent of stories. The survey also found that more experienced journalists used 
confidential sources more frequently.
70
 A survey of Florida journalists found that the use 
of confidential sources had declined over the ten years from 1974 to 1984.
71
  A survey of 
Pulitzer Prize winners indicated they used some type of confidential information in about 
30 percent of their stories during the same time period, though.
72
 An additional survey of 
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300 television and newspaper journalists indicated that 76 percent believed the use of 
confidential sources was essential to reporting some of their stories.
73
  
Overall, journalists also do not take the use of confidential sources lightly. Most 
journalists are dedicated to protecting their sources. Surveys of journalists in 1982, 1992, 
and 2002, found that less than 10 percent of journalists believed that there was 
justification for agreeing to protect confidentiality and not doing so.
74
 
A 1996 survey of editors at 64 large-circulation American daily newspapers found 
that 92 percent allowed the use of confidential sources.
75
 Even though using confidential 
sources was widespread, editors allowed journalists to use these sources only with 
discretion. Nearly all surveyed editors allowed the use of confidential sources only as a 
last resort to gain information. About 80 percent of the editors said confidential sources 
must be described in as much detail as possible in a story. More than three-fourths of 
editors required reporters to disclose names of confidential sources to them. A similar 
proportion of papers required additional verification steps of the confidential source’s 
information.
76
  
 The use of confidential sources has benefits. One study found that stories with 
confidential sources were more critical than other stories. The research suggested that 
confidential sources lead to greater diversity of viewpoints and criticism of those in 
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power. The author suggested that this diversity and criticism has civic value.
77
 Sources 
could also be more willing to publicly share information when a journalist promises 
confidentiality. The ability to grant confidentiality to a source allows journalists to 
present a richer understanding to citizens. Journalists can then provide a more accurate 
picture of reality to the public.
78
  
 Journalists’ use of unnamed sources has significant pitfalls, though. Readers view 
stories without named sources as less credible.
79
 Sources who are granted confidentiality 
also could feel free to say whatever they want without feeling accountable for their 
statements.
80
 In the most alarming situations, journalists can completely fabricate 
information and then claim that it came from confidential sources. One high profile 
example of this was former Washington Post reporter Janet Cooke’s story about 
“Jimmy,” an 8-year-old heroin addict. Cooke convinced her editors that she could not 
reveal the identity of Jimmy because of promises of confidentiality. The revelation that 
the story was fabricated came out after Cooke had won a Pulitzer Prize.
81
  
The Historical Development of Journalist’s Privilege 
Journalistic protections of confidential information can be found as early as 
colonial times in America. Shepard suggested that the duty to protect confidential 
identities started with colonial publishers who kept the names of their anonymous writers 
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confidential.
82
 Particularly, the early cases of jailed publishers James Franklin and John 
Peter Zenger set the foundation for such protection.
83
 James Franklin began publishing 
the New-England Courant in 1721. The Courant made a habit of criticizing both public 
and religious officials.
84
 The Courant used writers who had pseudonyms or were 
anonymous. The Courant’s criticisms often resulted in Franklin being the subject of local 
government’s ire. Unsurprisingly, Franklin was jailed several times but did not reveal the 
names of the different writers.
85
 
 In 1734, Zenger, publisher of the New York Weekly Journal, ran into trouble when 
he published a series of critical articles about Governor William Cosby. Unappreciative 
of the criticism, Cosby ordered Zenger to be arrested and charged with seditious libel. 
The jailed Zenger refused to reveal the names of people who had written the offensive 
articles.
86
 Zenger was eventually acquitted of the charges after his lawyer, Andrew 
Hamilton, convinced a jury that the truth could not be libelous. Although the case focused 
on libel, Shepard pointed out that Hamilton addressed the idea of confidentiality. 
Hamilton maintained that Zenger’s protection of the authors’ identities was rooted in the 
right of speaking and writing to oppose unrestrained power.
87
 
 Granted, neither of these publishers held the conception of a privilege that many 
journalists hold today. Rather, both publishers placed high value on anonymous speech. 
The publishers protected the writers of news stories, which Shepard suggested is not 
dissimilar from contemporary journalists’ arguments to protect information about 
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sources.
88
 Modern journalists argue that many sources need assurances of confidentiality. 
Any revelation of a source’s identity might lead to some form of punishment. Both 
Franklin’s and Zenger’s anonymous writers could have faced sanctions if the government 
knew their identities.  
 During the 19th and 20th centuries, journalism continued to develop. The 19th 
century saw the rise of modern conceptions of journalism through the penny press.
89
 
Newspapers changed from being the mouthpieces of political parties to objective 
purveyors of truth. Journalism also began its professionalization process in the early 20th 
century. The process resulted in universities creating journalism programs, journalists 
stating their importance to the public, the creation of professional organizations, and the 
development of journalistic codes of ethics.
90
 
 During the 1800s and early 1900s, journalist’s privilege also developed. The 19th 
century saw multiple examples of journalist being jailed for refusing to disclose the 
names of confidential sources.
91
 In 1848, the United States Senate held New York Herald 
journalist John Nugent in a committee room for a month. Nugent refused to identify who 
gave him information about a secret treaty to end the United States’ war with Mexico.92 
James W. Simonton of the New York Daily Times was jailed in 1857 for refusing to 
disclose who gave him information about land speculators giving bribes to U.S. 
representatives.
93
  Journalists Elisha J. Edwards and John S. Shriver found themselves in 
                                                     
88
 Id., at 112-113. 
89
 See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 12-
59 (1978). 
90
 See generally MARION TUTTLE MARZOLF, CIVILIZING VOICES: AMERICAN PRESS CRITICISM 1880-1950, 
14 (1991); Stephen A. Banning, “Truth is Our Ultimate Goal”: A Mid-19th Century Concern for 
Journalism Ethics, 16 AM. JOURNALISM 17 (1999); SHEPARD, supra note 82, 113-120.  
91
 SHEPARD, supra note 82, 120-125. 
92
 Id., at 121.  
93
 Id., at 122.  
21 
 
 
jail after they refused to reveal their sources of information about senators receiving 
bribes from the sugar industry.
94
 The 20th century also had several instances of 
journalist’s privilege cases. State and federal appellate courts had addressed issues of 
journalist’s privilege in nine criminal cases between 1900 and 1960.95 Journalists lost all 
decisions on the privilege during that time span, even in states that had enacted a shield 
statute.
96
 
 During the 19th and early 20th century, journalist’s used different justifications 
for concealing the identities of their sources. Journalists argued that they would lose the 
ability to effectively do their jobs if the government required the disclosure of 
confidential sources’ names.97 Journalists invoked constitutional rights against self-
incrimination.
98
 Journalistic codes of ethics also began to allude to the idea that 
journalist’s had a duty to protect sources. By the 1940s, many ethical codes specifically 
addressed the protection of confidential sources.
 99
 In fact, codes of ethics continue to 
state the importance of journalists keeping promises of confidentiality.
100
 All of these 
arguments rose out of the idea that journalists were professionals. As professionals, 
journalists needed to distinguish themselves from other citizens. The argument that 
journalists should not be required to testify about sources was one way in which they 
could set themselves apart from the general populace. 
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 In the middle of the 20th century, journalists began making a new argument in 
courts of the basis for a privilege. The advancement came in 1958 when a reporter made 
the argument that the First Amendment provided journalists a testimonial privilege to 
protect sources.
101
 Garland v. Torre
102
 was a libel case in which actress Judy Garland 
sought the name of a person who made defamatory comments about her in a New York 
Herald Tribune article. Marie Torre, the author of the article, refused to reveal the name 
of her source because she had promised confidentiality. The trial court held Torre in 
contempt for her refusal to identify the source. She appealed the decision to the United 
States Second Circuit of Appeals. In her appeal, Torre claimed that the First Amendment 
granted journalists a right to protect confidential sources.
103
 
 Justice Potter Stewart, before his appointment to the United States Supreme 
Court, wrote the opinion for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In the opinion, the 
court rejected Torre’s First Amendment claims. The court acknowledged that the required 
disclosure of a journalist’s sources could potentially abridge press freedom. The court 
stated that the freedom of the press was not absolute, though. The rights of the press must 
be balanced against the need of the courts to discover truth.
104
 Stewart explained that 
Garland’s request for the name of Torre’s source was directly relevant to the case. 
Stewart also noted that Garland had exhausted all other means to learn the name of the 
source before she requested the information from Torre. Thus, Torre was obligated to 
reveal the information.
105
 Torre appealed the decision to the United States Supreme 
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Court, but the Court declined to hear the case.
106
 Ultimately, Torre spent 10 days in 
jail.
107
 She never revealed her source to anyone, including her family.
108
 
 Garland v. Torre was a significant move forward for journalist’s privilege. Prior 
to the case, journalists had not argued in court that the First Amendment provided 
journalists the ability to protect sources. Despite Torre’s lack of success, other journalists 
began making similar arguments. Some journalists were even successful in their cases.
109
 
Over time, state and federal courts began to take different approaches on whether the 
First Amendment provided a journalist’s privilege. The United States Supreme Court 
needed to determine whether the privilege could be found in the Constitution. 
Branzburg v. Hayes 
 The only time the United States Supreme Court has addressed whether the First 
Amendment grants a journalist’s privilege was in Branzburg v. Hayes.110 The case 
consolidated four cases from lower courts. Two involved Paul Branzburg, a Kentucky 
journalist, who had written stories about drug use in Jefferson and Franklin counties. In 
both cases, a grand jury ordered Branzburg to appear and answer questions about the 
sources of his stories. Branzburg refused to answer maintaining he had a First 
Amendment privilege to protect the confidentiality of his sources. The Kentucky 
appellate courts decided that Branzburg did not have such a privilege.
111
 
 The third case focused on news coverage of the Black Panthers. The Black 
Panther party in New Bedford, Massachusetts, allowed journalist Paul Pappas into the 
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group’s headquarters to report on an expected police raid. The condition of entry was 
premised on Pappas’ agreement to not disclose anything he saw or heard other than the 
raid. The raid never occurred. As a result, Pappas did not write a story about what had 
happened inside the headquarters. Nonetheless, a Bristol county grand jury subpoenaed 
Pappas. Pappas attempted to have a court dismiss the subpoena on First Amendment 
grounds without success. Eventually, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the 
First Amendment did not grant journalists a testimonial privilege.
112
 
 The final case also involved coverage of the Black Panthers. Earl Caldwell was a 
New York Times reporter assigned to cover various black militant groups. A federal grand 
jury ordered Caldwell to testify about information on the Black Panthers he obtained in 
various interviews. Caldwell and the Times moved to dismiss the subpoena, stating that 
the mere appearance before a grand jury would hinder his ability to work with sources in 
the different groups. A court denied the motion to dismiss. Caldwell still refused to 
appear, which led to a court finding him in contempt. Eventually, the United States Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the First Amendment did provide a qualified 
testimonial privilege to protect sources.
113
 
 After hearing the consolidated cases, the Supreme Court determined that the First 
Amendment did not empower journalists to defy grand juries. Justice Byron White wrote 
the opinion for the five justice majority. The court held that the Constitution provided a 
testimonial privilege only against self-incrimination through the Fifth Amendment. The 
First Amendment did not provide a similar privilege.
114
 White’s opinion also stated that 
the court was hesitant to grant such a privilege because of the inherent problems in 
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defining journalists. The First Amendment did not simply protect professional journalists. 
The idea of who was a journalist was far more encompassing.
115
 White’s opinion was 
limited, though. He stated that state courts had the ability to read their state constitutions 
in a way that provided a journalist’s privilege. Also, state legislatures were free to enact 
statutes that granted journalists a testimonial privilege.
116
 
 Justice Lewis Powell wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Powell’s opinion has 
provided the basis for important interpretations of Branzburg. He stated that journalists 
could use the court system if they believed the government was harassing them. Justice 
Powell believed that courts needed to take a case-by-case approach to balancing press 
freedoms and the need for journalists’ testimony. His opinion suggested that courts 
should compel a journalist’s testimony only when the information was relevant to the 
case at hand.
117
 
 The decision prompted two dissenting opinions. Justice William Douglas 
dissented because of his belief that the First Amendment was absolute. On those grounds, 
a journalist did not have to testify.
118
 He was concerned that journalists’ sources would be 
reluctant to provide important information. The majority’s decision could also lead to 
journalists becoming hesitant to write about particular topics.
119
 Justice Potter Stewart 
wrote the other dissenting opinion. Justice Stewart’s dissent indicated that he believed the 
First Amendment did provide a qualified privilege for journalists. His opinion laid out a 
three-part test that the government must meet before a journalist could be required to 
disclose a confidential source. The test required the government to show that a 
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journalist’s testimony was relevant, unavailable through other means, and the government 
had a compelling need for the information. Upon such a showing, a court could require a 
journalist to testify.
 120
 
 Over time, both Justice Powell’s and Justice Stewart’s opinions have been 
significant. After Branzburg, Caldwell’s attorney, James Goodale, made the case that 
Justice Powell’s opinion created a plurality decision. He suggested that the concurring 
opinion recognized that situations could occur when journalists would not be required to 
provide testimony.
121
 Justice Powell’s decision also highlighted that the government did 
not have an absolute right to require a journalist’s testimony. If the government has only 
a qualified right to obtain testimony, Goodale reasoned, then journalists must have a 
qualified privilege to withhold testimony.
122
 Unsurprisingly, this type of thinking has 
caused many state and federal courts to recognize a First Amendment privilege in the 
Branzburg decision.
123
 Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion has become critical because 
many judges have adopted the three-part test he laid out to balance journalist’s rights with 
a court’s search for truth.124 
Shield Statutes, Journalist’s Privilege, and the States 
It is important to note the conceptual distinction between journalist’s privilege 
and shield statutes. Journalist’s privilege is a testimonial privilege that courts typically 
find in common law or constitutional law. A person who is allowed to invoke a 
testimonial privilege can refuse to provide information or testimony that could be 
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relevant to a trial, hearing, or proceeding. Testimonial privileges typically conflict with 
the discovery of truth. Therefore, privileges are rare exceptions to rules that require 
testimony.
125
 Privileges are typically discouraged unless certain conditions are met.
126
 
Conceptually different, shield statutes grant journalists a testimonial privilege in some 
form.
127
 Essentially, all shield statutes are a type of journalist’s privilege, but not all 
forms of journalist’s privilege are shield statutes. 
Federally, no shield legislation has been passed, but it has been considered. The 
first significant push for a federal shield law came immediately after the decision of 
Branzburg in 1972.
128
  In the six years following Branzburg, Congress made several 
attempts to pass federal shield legislation. The proposals failed primarily because 
supporters could not agree on the definition of journalist and press groups’ demands for 
an absolute privilege.
129
 During the 2000s, several high profile cases of journalists 
spending time in jail for refusing to reveal confidential sources have encouraged 
Congress to reconsider a federal shield law.
130
 More recently, controversies surrounding 
the United States Justice Department’s use of subpoenas to obtain the phone records of 
Associated Press journalists have reinvigorated a push for the law.
131
 The Free Flow of 
Information Act
132
 has had some support in Congress over time, but the proposed shield 
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law has consistently failed to gain full approval.
133
 Controversies surrounding 
WikiLeaks’ disclosure of highly classified government information in 2010 have 
previously weakened the case for the legislation.
134
  
At the state level, thirty-nine states have adopted shield statutes to protect 
journalists.
 135
 In other states, court opinions have provided journalists with shield 
protection.
136
 States vary in the types of protection provided to journalists. States differ in 
who is eligible for protection as well as what situations allow journalists to have 
protection.
 
Some states provide absolute testimonial privileges to journalists. Other states 
allow the privilege to be overcome if a party seeking information can meet particular 
conditions.
137
 States have developed differing views as to whether non-confidential 
information fell under journalist’s privilege.138 Overall, states have not taken a uniform 
approach to establish a journalist’s privilege. 
Empirical Approaches to Analyzing Law 
 A call for the use of social science techniques to study media law came from 
Cohen and Gleason. They suggested that communication scholars should not use the 
same tools as legal scholars to study media law. Rather, communication scholars should 
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use the tools of communication research to develop additional perspectives on law.
139
 
Several scholars have used this type of approach to study variations in media law among 
states.  
 Hale attempted to find correlations in an ambitious study of legal press rights in 
states and categories of state characteristics. He identified 43 variables that fell into five 
broad categories including media, political, economic, sociological and cultural 
characteristics.
140
 His results indicated that only 25 of the 344 correlations were 
significant.
141
 Of the correlations that were significant, most fell within the state’s social 
characteristics. Characteristics such as population size, suburbanism and concentrations 
of population in a central city were positively correlated with laws protecting the press 
and access to government information.
142
 Political and economic characteristics provided 
few correlations, though.
143
 Hale concluded that many press law provisions were 
independent of state characteristics.
144
 The conclusion may have been a result of Hale’s 
lack of precision in measuring press law provisions and state characteristics rather than a 
lack of a state’s characteristics in affecting press law.  
 Other studies have focused on particular laws affecting the press. Pritchard and 
Nemeth compared state characteristics, specifically policy liberalism and political 
culture, to the content of the state’s public records laws. Their findings indicated that 
states with higher levels of policy liberalism tended to have more open public record 
laws. Political culture was not associated with the openness of the state laws, though.
145
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The results of the study suggested that particular state characteristics influenced laws 
within a state. If state characteristics influenced one specific type of law, such as public 
records laws, these characteristics could affect other state media laws.  
Pajari compared the relative openness of a state’s open records and meeting laws 
to state characteristics, such as demographics, political culture and regionalism.
146
 He 
used content analysis to classify the openness of the law and then made comparisons. 
Pajari’s findings suggested that states with broader sunshine laws tended to have lower 
per capita incomes, smaller amounts of public education funding and economic systems 
that were not heavily based on manufacturing. States with open laws tended to be located 
in the South and Mountain West regions of the United States.
147
 Pajari also found that 
states with a moralistic political culture tended to have narrow sunshine laws. The 
relationship between moralistic culture and open records laws was weak, though.
148
 
Pajari concluded that several sweeping changes in these regions, such as civil rights 
legislation and economic development, impacted the development of the laws.
149
 This 
study’s findings suggested that significant changes to state characteristics, such as the 
civil rights movement in the south, influenced the make-up of a state’s laws.  
Some additional studies have provided a basis for comparing state media laws. 
Hale and Scott examined the impact of the Minnesota News Council on libel litigation. 
The Minnesota News Council was designed to hear complaints about the accuracy and 
fairness of Minnesota’s news media. Many complaints involved alleged reputational 
damages. The researchers hypothesized that the presence of the council would slow the 
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rate of libel suits involving mass media compared to Minnesota’s bordering states. Their 
findings supported the hypothesis. The rate of libel litigation involving mass media was 
indeed lower in Minnesota than in surrounding states.
150
 Their findings indicated that 
even small changes in state characteristics can have impacts on the law between states.  
Hale conducted an additional study that compared the impact of state prohibitions 
of punitive damages on libel litigation. Hale compared the number of libel litigation 
appeals involving mass media organizations in five states allowing punitive damages and 
five states that did not. His findings indicated that the number of appeals was similar in 
states that did and did not allow punitive damages. The average amount of damages 
awarded was also similar in both types of states.
151
 Hale’s methodological approach 
provided alternative insight to defamation law. His findings seem to challenge common 
thought that plaintiffs and lawyers are more likely to aggressively pursue libel litigation 
in states allowing opportunities to collect larger amounts of damages. The study also 
focused on the effects that legal differences between states could potentially have on 
media law.  
Few studies have used empirical methods to analyze the law of journalist’s 
privilege. Most studies on the subject have focused on journalists’ use of confidential 
sources. Many of the studies have examined the effect of subpoenas on journalistic 
activity. Blasi surveyed journalists on the use of confidential sources and the effects of 
court subpoenas to testify. Blasi’s findings indicated that journalists typically used 
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confidential sources to verify information that they already have.
152
 Reporters believed 
that subpoena threats made interpretive reporting more difficult.
153
 The surveyed 
journalists also expressed that ethical obligations to sources should be determined 
personally rather than in a court.
154
 Blasi’s findings also indicated that only 35 percent of 
journalists were certain whether their state had a shield law.
155
 His study was a precursor 
to his further studies on press subpoenas.
156
 Osborn also conducted a survey of journalists 
to measure the effects of subpoenas on the use of confidential sources. His findings 
suggested that journalists still used confidential sources despite the threat of 
subpoenas.
157
 St. Dizier surveyed Florida reporters to examine whether they used sources 
differently after the Branzburg decision and Janet Cooke scandal. His findings indicated 
that journalists used confidential sources less frequently and more cautiously.
158
  
In a study similar to Blasi’s study on the impact of subpoenas, Jones conducted a 
survey of more than 750 daily newspaper editors and television station news directors 
affiliated with ABC, NBC, CBS and FOX.
159
 Among other items, the survey measured 
newsroom leaders’ knowledge of possible protections from subpoenas, such as shield 
statutes and case law. The results indicated that approximately 20 percent of editors and 
news directors were not sure whether their state had a shield statute. The results also 
indicated that news leaders in states with a court-made journalist’s privilege were less 
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likely to be aware of protections.
160
 Jones suggested that some media members are 
confused about legal protections in their state. Particularly, smaller news organizations 
tend to be the most misinformed about journalist’s privilege.161 Jones’ study provided 
insight into news leaders understanding of journalist’s privilege. Unfortunately, it does 
not provide much information on the law itself.  
A 2005 University of Connecticut survey focused on the opinions of the public 
and journalists. The findings indicated that 87 percent of journalists supported the 
passage of a federal shield law. The results also suggested that 55 percent of the 
American public support federal shield legislation for journalists.
162
 A 2001 Reporters 
Committee for the Freedom of the Press (RCFP) survey of journalists about subpoenas 
suggested some unusual results. In states with shield statutes, news organizations 
received an average of 3.1 subpoenas per news outlet. News organizations located in 
states without a shield statute reported receiving an average of 1.7 subpoenas per outlet. 
These results were similar to previous RCFP surveys that indicated news organizations in 
states with shield statutes received, on average, more subpoenas than organizations in 
non-shield statute states.
163
 This finding suggested that one potential reason for the 
development of a state shield statute could be the number of subpoenas news 
organizations received. The study also found that news organizations were more likely to 
have a court dismiss a subpoena in states with shield statutes. News organizations in 
states with shield statutes reported they were able to quash subpoenas 22 percent of the 
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time.
164
 The results could indicate that investigators, courts, or parties to litigation are 
issuing subpoenas to journalists only when the shield could likely be overcome. Granted, 
the rate did seem low, but it was higher than the five percent of subpoenas dismissed in 
non-shield statute states.
165
  
One study has focused on an analysis of the content of shield statutes.
166
 
Alexander and Cooper conducted a textual analysis of state shield statutes to determine 
each statute’s relative strength. They judged the statutes based on who was protected, 
what was protected, when protections apply and whether the privilege had qualifications. 
The results indicated that many of the state statutes protected similar people and 
industries. Nearly all newspaper and broadcast outlet employees were protected. 
Additionally, all state statutes explicitly protected confidential sources. The states did 
vary what non-traditional journalists might receive protection, though. The states also 
varied in whether the statutes provided an absolute or qualified privilege. States had 
several different qualifications that could override a journalist’s privilege.167 Overall, this 
study provided different insight from other studies because it examined the text of 
individual statutes. Unfortunately, the researchers did not examine any relevant court 
decisions on journalist’s privilege. The court opinions could establish how journalist’s 
privilege was actually interpreted in the state. The study did not account for how the laws 
actually behaved because it did not examine court opinions. Several states were also not 
considered for study because the journalist’s privilege had not been written into law.  
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The previous studies, while informative, provided very little information on the 
law of journalist’s privilege. In fact, most of the studies focused on ways that the 
privilege was related to subpoenas. The studies also tended to focus on the perceptions of 
journalists and editors. The study that focused on the text of shield statutes failed to 
consider the influence court decisions can have on the interpretation of law. Additionally, 
the study did not provide any comparison to state characteristics that potentially 
influenced the development of a state’s shield statute. Thus, there is a major gap of 
knowledge on what state factors can influence the development of states’ journalist’s 
privilege.  
Hypotheses 
 The variation of shield protections from state to state leads to the question this 
thesis will focus on. What characteristics influence the breadth of shield protections in the 
states? States differ in many ways, but two particular ways in which states can vary are in 
political culture and policy liberalism. Political culture influences citizen’s views of 
government political participation,
168
 so policies shaping the flow of information could 
also be influenced. Specifically, moralistic political cultures encourage citizens to 
participate in government. A way to involve people in political participation is to develop 
a setting with a free flow of information. Moralistic states may recognize that journalist’s 
privilege protections could provide a more open setting for producing information, thus: 
H1: States with moralistic political cultures will provide a broader testimonial 
privilege for journalists than states with traditionalistic or individualistic 
cultures. 
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Policy liberalism has wide-ranging implications for how laws and policies are shaped in a 
particular state. Shield protections are not likely immune from this influence. Typically, 
journalists favor legislation that grants more rights for and fewer restrictions on the press. 
States with higher levels of policy liberalism may tend to have more expansive views of 
protection for journalists, therefore:    
H2: States with higher scores of policy liberalism will provide a broader 
testimonial privilege for journalists than those states with lower scores.  
Figure 2-1: Concepts and hypothesized influence 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
Methodological Approach 
This research focused on journalist’s privilege as recognized in state constitutions, 
statutes and state appellate court decisions. Specifically, the goal was to identify whether 
certain state characteristics influence how broadly a state recognizes journalist’s 
privilege. The units of analysis for the study were states. The units of observation were 
state constitutions, statutes and relevant state appellate court decisions as well as 
indicators of political culture and policy liberalism.  
 The method for the study was content analysis. Content analysis is the systematic 
analysis of recorded communication.
169
 An advantage of this method is that it can turn 
significant amounts of complicated raw data into a standardized arrangement. The 
advantage was particularly useful in this study because of the various and complex ways 
states have recognized journalist’s privilege. Content analysis is also useful because the 
data are quantified. The quantified data are beneficial because comparison and analysis 
with other quantified data become very easy.  
 Although the standardization of data is advantageous, it comes at a price. One 
disadvantage of content analysis is that detail can be lost. This fact is especially important 
because legal analysis relies on interpretations, context, and the interaction of law. 
Content analysis of laws and court opinions cannot always account for these factors.
170
 
Another disadvantage is that content analysis can prevent research from obtaining a high 
level of validity. It is possible that I overlooked important provisions of journalist’s 
privilege. To counteract this problem, I identified and classified as many provisions of 
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journalist’s privilege as possible. Also, the study examined both shield statutes and state 
appellate court opinions about journalist’s privilege to capture more detail.  
 Another method this study could have used was textual analysis. Textual analysis 
is similar to content analysis in that both methods examine recorded communication. 
Textual analysis, which uses a qualitative approach, aims to provide an understanding of 
the meaning behind texts. Most legal analysis takes this approach. Although this method 
provides a deeper understanding of the law, the study’s goal was not designed to 
specifically understand what the law meant. Rather, the study focused on what specific 
state characteristics can predict the breadth of journalist’s privilege. Textual analysis 
would not produce the proper data to make relevant comparisons. 
Data Collection 
 As noted previously, state statutes, constitutions, and state appellate court 
decisions shape journalist’s privilege.  I compiled a variety of information to understand 
any given state’s breadth of journalist’s privilege. I identified state shield statutes in 
several ways. Websites such as the First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University
171
 
and the Digital Media Law Project
172
 have compiled lists of state shield statutes. I used 
the lists to identify the 39 different shield statutes. I then viewed the full text of the 
statutes in LexisNexis. I used several sources to identify state appellate court decisions 
that focused on journalist’s privilege. Primarily, Westlaw’s Key Number Digest database 
found most opinions.
173
 The Media Law Resource Center’s Media Libel Law guide174 and 
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the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press’ reporter’s privilege compendium175 
provided additional references for state appellate court decisions.  
I excluded state trial court opinions primarily for two reasons. First, state trial 
court decisions rarely appear in standard case law reporters. As a result, a significant 
number of trial court decisions were unavailable. Second, a trial court’s decision is not 
binding upon higher courts within a state. Therefore, the influence of trial court decisions 
is limited.  
The study limited the analysis to state appellate court decisions from 1964 
through 2012. The concept of journalist’s privilege certainly extends well beyond the 
previous five decades. Journalism law markedly changed, with New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan
176
 in 1964, though.
177
 The Sullivan decision ushered in a new wave of First 
Amendment understanding. This change shaped the modern forms of media law.  
Index of Shield Breadth 
I created an index to create a score for the breadth of journalist’s privilege in each 
state. The index allowed for a comparison between state characteristics and a journalist’s 
privilege in states. The index provided equal weight to each factor of law. States that had 
more factors providing journalist’s privilege indicated broader protection. 
I used existing literature
178
 and state statutes to identify several key factors of the 
journalist’s privilege index. Multiple categories made up a state’s journalist’s privilege. 
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Each category had several different provisions. The first category was the source of 
protection. States have found a basis for journalist’s privilege in several different ways. 
States have enacted statutes that create a testimonial privilege. States could base the 
protection in state constitutions through amendments or court opinions. State appellate 
courts have also found a basis for journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment. Another 
source for journalist’s privilege also came from the judge-created common law.  
Each source for journalist’s privilege had advantages and disadvantages. Shield 
statutes and amended constitutions provided specific language of the types of protections. 
Specific language gave journalists a relatively clear idea of whether certain types of 
information could be protected. Courts were often reluctant to interpret statutes in ways 
that are outside the plain meaning of a statute, though. Therefore, a shield statute could be 
limiting at times. A journalist’s privilege based in court opinions could potentially be 
more dynamic. Courts have the ability to be flexible. Courts could continue to broaden 
protections for journalists in states without a privilege. The disadvantage of a privilege 
based in court opinions was that some decisions were later overruled. Courts that once 
provided broad protections could certainly narrow the privilege in the future. 
The second category was the scope of journalist’s privilege. States with a broader 
privilege recognized that journalists protected information other than a confidential 
source. Additional materials included unpublished information such as notes, drafts, 
unused footage, tape recordings, and photographs. States that protected these types of 
materials, even if they did not identify a confidential source, had a broader privilege. In 
some states, the privilege only applies if journalists made an explicit promise of 
confidentiality to a source. States with a broader privilege provided protection for sources 
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regardless of confidentiality. Finally, some states granted protection for a journalist’s 
eyewitness observations. States that protected such observations had a broader privilege.  
The third category was the different contexts in which journalists could invoke the 
privilege. States that grant broad protections protect in several different situations. 
Journalists receive subpoenas that request information in a variety of settings. 
Investigators or investigative bodies, such as grand juries, have requested information 
from journalists. Legislative bodies have called upon journalists to reveal information. 
Criminal defendants asked for information to aid in their defense. Parties in civil 
litigation attempted to require testimony from non-party journalists. Libel plaintiffs 
sought the names of confidential sources to pursue legal action. States with a broader 
privilege provided protection in more of these contexts. The type of protection was also 
important. An absolute privilege provided more protection than a privilege that could be 
overturned under certain circumstances. States with broader privileges granted an 
absolute privilege in more contexts. Additionally, some states provided a qualified 
privilege. Any form of a privilege was stronger than no privilege at all.  
The final category was based on who was eligible to invoke the privilege. States 
with a broader privilege allowed for shield protections to extend to people besides 
traditional media. Traditional journalists are not the only people who use confidential 
sources while engaged in journalistic activities. Freelance journalists, authors, bloggers, 
academics, students, documentarians and issue activists have used confidential sources to 
gather information. These types of people gathered information with the specific intent to 
disseminate and publish. States with broader protections extended privileges to more 
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kinds of information gatherers and disseminators. States that had a narrow privilege 
protected only journalists associated with traditional news organizations.  
Coding and Analysis 
The coding varied slightly depending on the information. I coded both the source 
of journalist’s privilege and who could invoke the privilege as either a 2 or 0 for yes or 
no, respectively. I coded the scope of a state’s privilege as a 2, 1, or 0. A 2 meant that the 
type of information was protected. A 1 meant some types of the information could be 
protected. A 0 meant that the information was not protected. I also coded the context in 
which the privilege applied as a 2, 1, or 0. A 2 meant that journalists had an absolute 
privilege in that type of setting. A 1 meant that journalists had a qualified privilege in that 
type of setting. A 0 meant journalist’s privilege was not available in that setting. Upon 
completion of the state’s coding, I summed the state’s coded numbers to create a final 
score for a state’s journalist’s privilege shield strength.179 
Once in numerical form, the breadth of journalist’s privilege was compared to 
state characteristics. The two characteristics for comparison were policy liberalism and 
political culture. Policy liberalism had four scores. The first score was Klingman and 
Lammers’ measure of states’ general policy liberalism. Klingman and Lammers used six 
variables to develop a state’s score.180 The variables represented a range of expenditure-
based and non-fiscal policy. The measures were based on data that ranged from 1961 to 
1977. The second score was Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s score of composite policy 
liberalism. The scores were based on eight different variables.
181
 The variables were 
based primarily on non-fiscal policy areas. The data for the variables represented a state’s 
                                                     
179
 The coding scheme materials can be found in Appendix A. 
180
 For a full explanation of the variables, see Klingman & Lammers, supra note 28, at 599-600.  
181
 For a full explanation of the variables, see ERIKSON ET AL., supra note 30, at 75-76. 
43 
 
 
policy liberalism around 1980. The third and fourth scores were Sorens, Muedini, and 
Ruger’s scores of state policy liberalism. The scores were based on more than 170 
different state and local policies.
182
 The variables included both fiscal and non-fiscal state 
policies. The 2008 score represented a state’s policy liberalism as of December 31, 2008. 
The 2010 score represented a state’s policy liberalism as of December 31, 2010. 
Table 3-1 reports the policy liberalism scores. The Policy Liberalism Score (1984) 
indicated the Klingman and Lammers state factor scores of general policy liberalism in 
the second column.
183
 The scores ranged from -2.061 to 1.862. The higher state scores 
represented higher levels of policy liberalism. Negative scores indicated a state’s 
tendency to adopt conservative-oriented policies. The Policy Liberalism Score (1993) 
indicated the Erikson, Wright, and McIver scores in the third column.
184
 The scores 
ranged from -1.54 to 2.12. Once again, higher scores represented a higher level of state 
policy liberalism. The negative scores indicated states with more conservative policies. 
The number in parentheses next to each score reported the state’s rank on that particular 
policy liberalism scale. Neither set of researchers had data to for Alaska or Hawaii. The 
table does not include a score for either state.  
The Policy Liberalism Score (2008) indicated the Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger 
policy liberalism scores for 2008 in the fourth column. The scores ranged from -6.558986 
to 14.65067. The Policy Liberalism Score (2010) indicated the policy liberalism scores 
for 2010 in the fifth column. The scores ranged from -5.700675 to 14.65067. For both 
scores, higher scores represented higher levels of policy liberalism.  
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Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger did have policy liberalism scores for Alaska and 
Hawaii. I excluded the scores for two reasons, though. First, Klingman and Lammers as 
well as Erikson, Wright, and McIver did not have scores for Alaska and Hawaii. 
Therefore, to make the analysis of policy liberalism more comparable across time, I did 
not include the Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger scores for those states. Second, Alaska and 
Hawaii are much newer states than the 48 contiguous states. The development of 
journalist’s privilege in the United States began well before either state was a part of the 
union. The policy liberalism of the other 48 states likely influenced the early 
development of journalist’s privilege before Hawaii and Alaska had applied for 
statehood.  
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Table 3-1: State Policy Liberalism Scores  
State 
Liberalism Score 
(1984) 
Liberalism Score 
(1993) 
Liberalism Score 
(2008) 
Liberalism Score 
(2010) 
Alabama -1.285 (44) -1.45 (45) -3.86446 (42) -4.330914 (43) 
Arizona -1.403 (45) -1.05 (43) -2.650717 (30) -3.101448 (38) 
Arkansas -1.863 (47) -1.54 (48) -3.561909 (41) -3.181858 (39) 
California 1.464 (4) 1.49 (3) 14.65067 (1) 14.80074 (1) 
Colorado 1.121 (9) 0.48 (17) -0.5932837 (21) -0.3259152 (23) 
Connecticut 1.453 (5) 1.19 (7) 6.87584 (7) 7.541123 (8) 
Delaware 0.09 (24) 1.11 (9) 2.719852 (10) 3.481929 (10) 
Florida -0.481 (31) -0.37 (28) -0.4811046 (20) -0.2184499 (21) 
Georgia -0.933 (41) -1.04 (42) -3.43501 (39) -2.934662 (35) 
Idaho 0.138 (21) -0.87 (36) -5.713753 (45) -5.594581 (46) 
Illinois 0.539 (14) 0.41 (20) 6.8053970 (8) 7.957626 (7) 
Indiana -0.615 (35) -1.2 (44) -2.281557 (29) -2.504499 (29) 
Iowa 0.303 (18) 0.44 (18) -0.4326032 (19) -0.0544632 (19) 
Kansas 0.207 (19) 0.24 (22) -3.2685320 (36) -2.92412 (34) 
Kentucky -0.304 (29) -0.32 (26) -2.211666 (28) -2.586181 (31) 
Louisiana -0.668 (36) -1.04 (41) -1.773365 (26) -1.615295 (27) 
Maine 0.119 (22) -0.02 (24) 1.663444 (12) 2.163893 (12) 
Maryland 0.393 (15) 0.85 (11) 8.49905 (6) 9.179784 (5) 
Massachusetts 1.805 (2) 1.64 (2) 12.6944 (3) 12.58624 (4) 
Michigan 1.1 (10) 1.18 (8) 3.35728 (9) 3.886693 (9) 
Minnesota 1.227 (8) 0.79 (12) 1.457715 (13) 1.523621 (14) 
Mississippi -2.061 (48) -1.51 (46) -4.714653 (43) -4.158239 (42) 
Missouri -0.895 (39) -0.55 (31) -3.490848 (40) -2.952449 (36) 
Montana 0.107 (23) 0.6 (16) -3.201081 (33) -2.712624 (32) 
Nebraska -0.251 (28) 0.44 (19) -3.271613 (37) -2.76664 (33) 
Nevada -1.17 (42) -0.35 (27) -1.7216 (25) -1.329185 (26) 
New Hampshire 0.386 (16) -0.14 (25) -0.6467845 (22) -0.2324234 (22) 
New Jersey 1.518 (3) 1.34 (5) 13.11908 (2) 13.12912 (3) 
New Mexico -0.146 (27) -0.99 (40) -2.027544 (27) -1.210673 (25) 
New York 1.862 (1) 2.12 (1) 12.60431 (4) 13.15749 (2) 
North Carolina -0.923 (40) -0.96 (38) 0.2267685 (17) 0.6476505 (17) 
North Dakota -0.11 (26) -0.52 (30) -6.558986 (48) -5.700675 (48) 
Ohio 0.145 (20) 0.64 (15) 1.012002 (15) 0.5903817 (18) 
Oklahoma -0.86 (38) -0.98 (39) -3.325849 (38) -3.240067 (40) 
Oregon 1.436 (6) 1.39 (4) 0.2098694 (18) 1.387446 (15) 
Pennsylvania 1.06 (11) 1.01 (10) 0.6582834 (16) 1.165166 (16) 
Rhode Island 0.871 (12) 0.68 (14) 8.74255 (5) 8.671363 (6) 
South Carolina -1.491 (46) -1.53 (47) -3.151124 (32) -2.476265 (28) 
South Dakota -0.582 (32) -0.95 (37) -5.468121 (44) -4.756213 (44) 
Tennessee -1.209 (43) -0.85 (35) -3.213797 (34) -2.582896 (30) 
Texas -0.389 (30) -0.65 (32) -3.257484 (35) -3.431674 (41) 
Utah -0.584 (33) -0.44 (29) -5.848618 (46) -5.03959 (45) 
Vermont 0.352 (17) 0.79 (13) 1.394279 (14) 1.936672 (13) 
Virginia -0.738 (37) -0.84 (34) -3.144677 (31) -3.048693 (37) 
Washington 0.576 (13) 0.35 (21) 2.63167 (11) 3.041979 (11) 
West Virginia -0.608 (34) 0.12 (23) -1.5328 (24) -1.197113 (24) 
Wisconsin 1.378 (7) 1.23 (6) -0.9285712 (23) -0.1621033 (20) 
Wyoming -0.081 (25) -0.7 (33) -6.367966 (47) -5.5982920 (47) 
Note: The number in parentheses indicated the state’s overall rank on a scale of 1 to 48. 
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Sharkansky’s state political culture classifications determined a state’s political 
culture.
185
 Sharkansky’s designations were based on Elazar’s work with minor 
adjustments. Sharkansky identified a variety of indicators that allowed for an empirical 
measure of state political culture.
186
 The process was different than Elazar’s, who created 
his designations based primarily on personal observations. Overall, though, Sharkansky’s 
and Elazar’s designations were closely matched.187  
Table 3-2 reports the results of Sharkansky’s classifications. Sharkansky’s scores 
identified 18 moralistic states, 18 traditionalistic states, and 14 individualistic states 
Table 3-2: State Political Cultures 
Moralistic Individualistic Traditionalistic 
California Alaska Alabama 
Colorado Arizona Arkansas 
Connecticut Hawaii Delaware 
Idaho Illinois Florida 
Iowa Indiana Georgia 
Maine Kansas Kentucky 
Michigan Massachusetts Louisiana 
Minnesota Nebraska Maryland 
Montana Nevada Mississippi 
New Hampshire New Jersey Missouri 
North Dakota New York New Mexico 
Oregon Ohio North Carolina 
Rhode Island Pennsylvania Oklahoma 
South Dakota Wyoming South Carolina 
Utah   Tennessee 
Vermont   Texas 
Washington   Virginia 
Wisconsin   West Virginia 
 
 
                                                     
185
 Ira Sharkansky, The Utility of Elazar’s Political Culture: A Research Note, POLITY, Autumn 1969, at 
72. 
186
 Id., at, 74.  
187
 Id., at 83.  
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Validity Check 
 To ensure that I coded the statutes and court opinions accurately, an additional 
person coded one state for a validity check. The additional coder and I agreed on most 
provisions. Of the few disagreements, the other coder and I discussed the particular 
provision of journalist’s privilege. After discussion, we agreed on the correct coding of 
the law in all cases.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
Coding Results 
I collected and analyzed the statutes of 37 states and more than 250 state appellate 
court decisions for this research.
188
 In several states, the shield statute was split between 
multiple sections of the state code. In two states, the state legislature had not enacted a 
state shield statute. Rather, the state supreme courts promulgated shield protections into 
the state rules of evidence.
189
 Five states had a shield statute but did not have any state 
appellate court decisions within the past 50 years that addressed journalist’s privilege.190 
Three states did not have a shield statute or have any state appellate court decisions 
within the past 50 years that addressed journalist’s privilege.191  
Several states based a journalist’s privilege in multiple sources of law. 192 The 
results of the coding indicated that appellate courts in 19 states recognized a basis for 
journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment. Courts in eight of those 19 states 
interpreted that their state constitution also provided a journalist’s privilege. Every state 
that had a basis for the privilege in the state constitution also found the privilege in the 
First Amendment. No state held that the state constitution alone provided a journalist’s 
privilege. California was the only state that had language that explicitly created a 
journalist’s privilege in the state constitution.  
Thirty-seven states had legislatively enacted shield statutes. In 23 of those states, 
the statute was the only source of the state’s journalist privilege. One state, New Mexico, 
                                                     
188
 See Appendix C for a complete list of the laws and appellate court decisions analyzed. A description of 
each state’s journalist’s privilege is also included in Appendix B. 
189
 Utah’s and New Mexico’s shield laws were both established through the actions of the state supreme 
court. 
190
 See Appendix C: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Nebraska, and Utah. 
191
 See Appendix C: Hawaii, Mississippi, and Wyoming.  
192
 See Appendix B: Results of coding for the source of journalist’s privilege.  
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had legislatively enacted a shield statute that the state supreme court later declared 
unconstitutional.
193
 Although New Mexico’s statute is still on the books, I did not code 
New Mexico as having a legislatively-enacted shield statute.   
Six states found a basis for journalist’s privilege in the common law. The 
common law was the only basis for journalist’s privilege in South Dakota and 
Massachusetts. In Utah and New Mexico, the state supreme court promulgated the 
privilege into the state rules of evidence. Therefore, I coded that the shield protection in 
Utah and Mexico were found in the common law. The other two states, Idaho and 
Washington, based the journalist’s privilege in other sources of law in addition to the 
common law basis. 
Hawaii, Mississippi and Wyoming did not have any source for journalist’s 
privilege. The appellate courts within those states had not recognized journalist’s 
privilege in the First Amendment, state constitution, or the common law. The three states 
also did not have a legislatively enacted shield. Hawaii previously had a shield statute, 
but it expired in 2013.
194
 
The scope of protection represented the different types of information that 
journalists could protect.
195
 The coding for this category represented only whether 
information could potentially receive protection.  Every state that recognized a 
journalist’s privilege provided protection for confidential sources. Thirty-four states 
allowed journalists to refuse to reveal information about sources whether or not the 
journalists promised confidentiality.  
                                                     
193
 Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976). 
194
 Jack Komperda, Hawaii Shield Law Will Expire after Lawmakers Unable to Reconcile Competing Bills, 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (May 3, 2013), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-
resources/news/hawaii-shield-law-will-expire-after-lawmakers-unable-reconcile-compe. 
195
 See Appendix B: Results of coding for scope of privilege protections. 
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Thirty states extended some form of protection to journalists’ unpublished 
information. Unpublished information that was protected typically included notes, 
outtakes, photographs, and film recordings. Statutes and state appellate court decisions 
provided protection for unpublished information. None of the states made distinctions 
among different types of information. The only distinction that courts made was for 
personal observations. Observations were accounted for in a different category.  
Six states expressly provided protection to journalists’ personal observations. 
Many states did not address whether a journalist’s personal observations were protected. 
The six states that protected observations specifically discussed that type of information 
either in the shield statute or court decisions. Of the six states, California was the only 
one that indicated it protected all of a journalist’s observations. The other five states 
made exceptions for the different kinds of observations a journalist could protect. 
Typically, journalists could not refuse to testify about eyewitness observations of certain 
crimes or acts of violence. 
Journalists could invoke the different types of a testimonial privilege in different 
settings.
196
 Thirty-two states had a qualified privilege in the situations when the privilege 
applied. The other 15 states provided journalists with an absolute privilege in at least one 
setting. In five states, journalist’s privilege could be used in only one context. Each of 
these states had only recognized a privilege through court opinions. 
Journalist’s privilege in 36 states granted journalists some form of protection from 
investigative subpoenas. Thirty-one states provided journalists a privilege in legislative 
hearings. Forty-three states provided protection to journalists in non-libel civil litigation. 
In each of the different situations, twelve states granted an absolute privilege. Journalists 
                                                     
196
 See Appendix B: Results of coding for situations when privilege applies. 
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could refuse to provide information to criminal defendants in 44 states. Only five states 
provided an absolute privilege in this context. Finally, 39 states granted journalists a 
privilege when they are libel defendants. Nine states allowed an absolute privilege. 
Four states appeared to provide an absolute journalist’s privilege in any type of 
setting. In two of the states, Alabama and Nebraska, appellate courts had not interpreted 
the statute. Another four states provided an absolute privilege in all settings except when 
criminal defendants needed information to maintain a defense. In those situations, each of 
the states held that the privilege was qualified. In several of these states, the shield statute 
had granted an absolute privilege but state appellate courts indicated that a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional rights trumped the shield.  
States varied on who could invoke the journalist’s privilege.197 A total of 44 states 
expressly allowed newspaper employees to claim journalist’s privilege. Three states that 
did not protect newspaper journalists had established journalist’s privilege through court 
opinions. None of the cases had involved newspapers. Although newspaper reporters 
would likely be covered, the state had not specifically addressed the issue. Therefore, I 
did not code newspaper reporters as having the privilege. The other three states where 
newspaper journalists were not protected did not recognize a journalist’s privilege. 
Forty-four states provided journalist’s privilege to television reporters. Employees 
of radio media could invoke journalist’s privilege in 39 states. Journalists in television 
and radio media are typically considered traditional journalists. The likelihood of a state 
extending the privilege to these types of journalists is very high. States without shield 
statutes have simply not addressed cases that involve radio and television journalists in 
state appellate courts. Once again, I did not code these journalists as having the privilege.  
                                                     
197
 See Appendix B: Results of coding for who can invoke journalist’s privilege.   
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Journalists for print media other than newspapers could invoke the privilege in 36 
states. Freelance journalists could also claim the privilege in 37 states. Freelance 
journalists were often covered in state statutes that granted protection to any person 
connected with news media. Only 10 states allowed book authors to use the privilege. 
Journalists who work for news media that publish exclusively online were 
explicitly covered in nine states. Bloggers who publish independently were not covered 
in any state. The language of some state shield statutes stated that journalists who 
published information electronically were entitled to protection. Internet journalists and 
bloggers certainly publish information electronically. The state was coded as providing 
the privilege to Internet journalists only if a state’s statute or appellate courts specifically 
addressed Internet journalists, though. 
As a whole, many states did not extend protections to non-traditional journalists. 
The Maryland and West Virginia shield statutes granted student journalists protection. 
Academic researchers in Delaware and Texas could invoke the privilege. Alaska, Illinois, 
and Louisiana have extended the privilege to documentary filmmakers. California 
allowed issue activists to use journalist’s privilege when they function as journalists. 
Finally, New Jersey has considered the publisher of an annual report rating insurers as a 
journalist for the purposes of the privilege. 
On average, states that recognized journalist’s privilege protected 4.85 different 
categories of people. New Jersey and Texas had the broadest definitions of journalists. 
Both states provided the privilege to eight types of people. California, Maryland and 
Washington also granted the privilege to seven different categories. Missouri, South 
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Dakota, Vermont and Virginia’s definition were the narrowest with each state providing 
the privilege to one category. None of these states had a shield statute, though.  
Table 4-1 reports the total score for each state on the state shield breadth index. 
California’s score of 36 was the highest among the states. Three states, Hawaii, 
Mississippi and Wyoming, had scores of zero. None of the three states had recognized 
journalist’s privilege in state appellate court decisions or state statutes. The mean score 
was 21.36. The mode for the data set was 23 with seven states having that score.  
 If the three states without a statute or appellate court decision recognizing 
journalist’s privilege are removed, the mean score was 22.72. The lowest score was 
seven. Missouri, South Dakota, and Virginia all scored seven on the shield breadth index.  
Table 4-1: Index score of individual state shield breadth 
State Total 
California 36 
New Jersey 34 
Texas 31 
Nebraska 30 
Wisconsin 30 
Louisiana 29 
New York 29 
Washington 29 
Delaware 28 
Florida 28 
West Virginia 28 
Maryland 27 
Oregon 27 
Kansas 26 
Montana 26 
Oklahoma 26 
Illinois 25 
Minnesota 25 
Nevada 25 
Ohio 25 
Pennsylvania 25 
Alabama 24 
Arizona 24 
Connecticut 24 
Kentucky 24 
State Total 
North Carolina 24 
Alaska 23 
Arkansas 23 
Colorado 23 
Indiana 23 
Michigan 23 
North Dakota 23 
South Carolina 23 
Georgia 22 
Tennessee 22 
Utah 19 
New Mexico 18 
Maine 17 
Rhode Island 17 
Idaho 16 
Iowa 13 
New Hampshire 13 
Massachusetts 12 
Vermont 9 
Missouri 7 
South Dakota 7 
Virginia 7 
Hawaii 0 
Mississippi 0 
Wyoming 0 
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Political Culture and Journalist’s Privilege Protections 
Table 4-2 reports the means comparison test of the state shield strength index 
score according to state political culture. 
Table 4-2: Means comparison test of shield strength according to political culture. 
Political Culture Mean Number of cases Standard Deviation 
Individualistic 21.50 14 10.301 
Moralistic 20.94 18 7.658 
Traditionalistic 21.67 18 8.534 
Shield Strength Index Score 21.36 50 8.595 
 
The first hypothesis suggested that states with moralistic political culture would 
provide broader protections for journalists than states with traditionalistic or 
individualistic cultures. Individualistic states had an average score of 21.50. 
Traditionalistic states had an average score of 21.67. Moralistic states had an average 
score of 20.94. The scores were not significantly different from each other. Therefore, the 
data did not support the first hypothesis.  
Policy Liberalism and Journalist’s Privilege Protections 
 The second hypothesis suggested that states with higher scores of policy 
liberalism would provide broader protections for states than those with lower scores. To 
test the hypothesis, I used Pearson correlations to examine the relationships between the 
Klingman and Lammers (1984) policy liberalism scores, the Erikson, Wright, and McIver 
(1993) policy liberalism scores, Sorens, Muedini, and Rugers 2008 and 2010 policy 
liberalism scores, and the index of shield strength. The results of the test are reported in 
Table 4-3.  
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Table 4-3: Correlations of policy liberalism and shield strength. 
 
Klingman & 
Lammers Score 
(1984) 
Erikson, Wright, 
& McIver Score 
(1993) 
Sorens, Muedini, 
& Ruger Score 
(2008) 
Sorens, Muedini, 
& Ruger Score 
(2010) 
Index of Shield 
Strength 
.272* .346** .345** .337** 
R
2
 .074 .120 .119 .113 
 N = 48     * p < .05     ** p < .01  
 First, the correlation between the Klingman and Lammers (1984) score and 
Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) score was .906 (p < .01). The correlation between 
the Klingman & Lammers (1984) score and the Sorens, Muedini, & Ruger 2008 and 2010 
scores were .710 (p < .01) and .720 (p < .01), respectively. The correlation between the 
Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1993) score and the Sorens, Muedini, & Ruger 2008 and 
2010 scores were .755 (p < .01) and .768 (p <.01), respectively. The high level of 
correlation among the scores is unsurprising. All scores aimed to measure state policy 
liberalism. The Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1993) score also incorporated two of the 
same policy issue indicators as the Klingman and Lammers (1984) score.  
The correlation between the index score of shield strength and the Klingman and 
Lammers (1984) score was .272 (p < .05). The correlation between the shield strength 
index score and the Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1993) score was .346 (p < .01). The 
correlation between the shield strength index score and the Sorens, Muedini, & Ruger 
(2008) score was .345 (p < .01). The correlation between the shield strength index score 
and the Sorens, Muedini, & Ruger (2010) score was .337 (p < .01).  Thus, the 
hypothesized relationship between policy liberalism and the strength of journalist’s 
protections within a state was supported. The Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1993) score 
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was the most strongly correlated with the state shield strength. Both versions of the 
Sorens, Muedini, & Ruger scores were also strongly correlated.  
Figure 4-1 is a scatterplot of the correlation between the Klingman and Lammers 
policy liberalism score and a state’s shield strength score.  
Figure 4-1: Distribution of shield strength according to Klingman & Lammers (1984) scores 
 
  The graph showed the trend of the shield strength index score increasing as the 
Klingman and Lammers policy liberalism score increases.  States that fell below the 
correlation line tended to be states that had not enacted a state shield statute. The biggest 
outliers of all the states were Mississippi and Wyoming. Neither state had recognized a 
journalist’s privilege in state appellate court decisions or through legislation. 
Massachusetts had a high policy liberalism score but a lower score on the shield strength 
index. The state had only recognized a journalist’s privilege in the common law. 
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California was an outlier because it provided expansive protections. The state had 
recognized several sources for journalist’s privilege and several different people could 
invoke the privilege. Several of California’s protections were also absolute.   
 Figure 4-2 is a scatterplot of the correlation between the Erikson, Wright, and 
McIver policy liberalism score and a state’s shield strength score. 
Figure 4-2: Distribution of shield strength according to Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1993) scores 
 
 Once again, the graph showed a trend of the state shield strength score increasing 
as the policy liberalism score increases. The correlation was stronger with the Erikson, 
Wright, and McIver (1993) policy score as compared to the Klingman and Lammers 
(1984) score. Many of the states that fell below the line were states without shield 
statutes. The outliers were also similar to the outliers on the Klingman and Lammers 
(1984) graph.  
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 Figure 4-3 is a scatterplot of the correlation between the Sorens, Muedini, & 
Roger policy liberalism score from 2008 and a state’s shield strength score. 
Figure 4-3: Distribution of shield strength according to Sorens, Muedini &Ruger (2008) scores 
 
 The graph showed the trend of state shield strength increasing as the policy 
liberalism increases. Several of the states that fell under the line were states that did not 
have a shield statute. Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Wyoming remained obvious 
outliers. California was not nearly as much of an outlier as it had been on the previous 
graphs.  
Figure 4-4 is a scatterplot of the correlation between the Sorens, Muedini, & 
Roger policy liberalism score from 2010 and a state’s shield strength score. 
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Figure 4-4: Distribution of shield strength according to Sorens, Muedini &Ruger (2010) scores 
 
 The graph once again showed the trend of state shield strength increasing as 
policy liberalism increases. Many of the states that fell below the line had not enacted 
shield statutes. Several of the outliers were similar to the outliers on the previous graphs.  
 As an additional check of other factors that may influence a state’s shield 
strength, I conducted correlation tests of the index of shield strength score and other state 
characteristics. Different state characteristics included the percentage of the two-party 
vote for Barack Obama in 2008
198
 and 2012,
199
 the percentage of high school graduates in 
                                                     
198
 Federal Election Commission, Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. 
Senate and the House of Representatives, available at 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalelections2008.pdf.  
199
 Federal Election Commission, Official 2012 Presidential General Election Results, available at 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/2012presgeresults.pdf. 
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the state,
200
 the percentage of people who had bachelor’s degrees in the state,201 and per 
capita personal income within the state.
202
 None of the additional state characteristics 
were significantly correlated with state shield strength.  
                                                     
200
 United States Census Bureau, American Community Survey: Educational Attainment, 2011 5-year 
estimates, available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/.  
201
 Id. 
202
 Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012 Per Capita Personal Income Summary, available at 
http://www.bea.gov.   
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
Discussion 
 The results of this study add to the evidence that state characteristics are 
important determinants of state media law. Specifically, the results suggested that policy 
liberalism is a better indicator of state shield protections than political culture. The 
relationships between several different measures of policy liberalism and the strength of 
protection journalists have were significant. The different policy liberalism scores created 
from several different years of data were similarly correlated with state shield strength. 
 State political culture did not seem to influence the breadth of states’ journalistic 
protections. The result was not entirely surprising because a previous study failed to find 
a significant relationship between political culture and the openness of public records 
law.
203
 Elazar highlighted that the major components of political culture include citizens’ 
perceptions of politics and government, the types of people involved in government, and 
the art of individuals practicing government.
204
 Each aspect highlighted the way 
individuals interact with government. None focus on the actual actions of government to 
create law. Certainly, political culture could influence the development of law, but it 
might be limited to affecting certain types of law. Media law does not appear to be one of 
the types of law that political culture influences.  
The relationship between policy liberalism and a state’s breadth of journalist’s 
privilege is important for several reasons. The results indicated that states with higher 
levels of policy liberalism tended to grant broader protections for journalists. Liberal 
states are more likely to grant journalists protections for different types of information 
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 Pritchard & Nemeth, supra note 12, at 54. 
204
 ELAZAR, supra note 22, at 112. 
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and in different situations. Liberal states also tend to have more diverse definitions of 
journalist. The finding is particularly significant because issues surrounding journalist’s 
privilege are not fully settled. Courts are still determining whether the United States 
Constitution or their state constitutions provide journalists a privilege. Courts are also 
still discussing who can be considered a journalist under their state laws. Also, several 
states have not enacted a shield statute that would create a journalist’s privilege. If those 
states do enact shield statutes, this study’s results suggest that the states with higher 
levels of policy liberalism will likely create broader protections for journalists. The 
results also suggest that even if states with low levels of policy liberalism enact a shield 
statute, protection would likely be greater than having no statute at all. Thus, journalists 
are justified in working toward the passage of shield legislation if they want broader 
protections.  
The results also suggest a larger trend in the development of media law in 
individual states. A previous study has suggested that policy liberalism was an important 
determinant of media law.
205
 This study’s results demonstrated that policy liberalism was 
a predictor of the strength of a state’s journalist’s privilege. The combination of the two 
studies begins to suggest that policy liberalism influences laws that affect journalists. 
Granted, broad conclusions about the nature of a particular type of law cannot be made 
from two studies alone. The results of the two studies are merely a starting place for a 
potential trend.  
 The law of journalist’s privilege exemplifies Justice Brandeis’ idea that states are 
“the laboratories of democracy.”206 Without any federal mandates of how a privilege 
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must be interpreted, states have been free to experiment within the confines of their own 
borders. States have shaped journalist’s privilege through statutes and court opinions in 
ways that are best suited for the state. As a result, states like California and New Jersey 
have granted journalists a strong privilege to protect information. Other states like 
Hawaii, Mississippi, and Wyoming have not found the need to clearly establish a 
testimonial privilege for journalists through statutes or appellate court decisions. The 
wide-range of diversity in the law of journalist’s privilege is a clear example of the 
American system of federalism.  
Another finding of this study is that states regularly define who is a journalist. 
The coding for who can invoke the privilege shows that most states have clearly 
established definitions of a journalist for purposes of the privilege. Several statutes 
explicitly spell out who is eligible for protection. State appellate courts have also limited 
definitions of journalists to certain types of people. The statutes and decisions usually 
place limits on who can invoke the privilege based on a person’s employment. 
Employees of traditional media are far more likely to be eligible for journalist’s privilege 
protections. As a result of defining journalists by their employment, few states have 
extended journalist’s privilege to non-traditional journalists. Some states are willing to 
view book authors as journalists. Fewer states explicitly include documentary 
filmmakers, student journalists, academics, or issue activists in the definition of 
journalists.  Overall, states are clearly willing to define who is a journalist.  This situation 
is quite the opposite of the philosophy of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court has been 
unwilling to create definitions of a journalist.
207
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 See Branzburg, supra note 3, at 703-704; Citizens United, supra note 6, at 891 (2010). 
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 This study also found that states have not significantly considered journalist’s 
privilege for new forms of media. State appellate courts or shield statutes in nine states 
have explicitly granted journalist’s privilege to people who work for Internet media. State 
appellate courts have not granted a privilege to any individual bloggers or lone internet 
publishers. New Jersey was the only state with an appellate court that considered whether 
a lone individual publishing online could qualify for the privilege.
208
 The lack of 
appellate court decisions doesn’t necessarily mean that bloggers are not facing subpoena 
challenges, though. Individual bloggers likely have limited monetary resources. They do 
not have the ability to pursue expensive, drawn-out legal actions. As a result, trial courts 
are likely the only courts resolving any issues involving bloggers and journalist’s 
privilege.  
Ultimately, one of the most significant questions about journalist’s privilege is 
whether it is good or bad. The answer is both. The fact that so many states have 
recognized a journalist’s privilege suggests that states believe the protection of sources is 
important to journalism. Many states are willing to provide a wide variety of shield 
protections to journalists, which suggest that many states recognize the importance of a 
privilege. Critics of a privilege argue that journalists’ suggestions of sources drying up 
are unfounded. Reporters will still use confidential sources despite the lack of protection. 
While this situation might be true, the general idea of jailing journalists for non-criminal 
reasons seems like a troubling proposition in any society that wants to foster free flowing 
information.  
The downside of journalist’s privilege is the current state of definitions of 
journalists. Many states define journalists by their employers. The landscape of 
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 Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209, 20 A.3d 364 (N.J. 2011). 
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journalism is steadily evolving to include people who will never work for a traditional 
media outlet. Journalists are leaving traditional media outlets to start their own blogs and 
websites to report news. Citizen journalists are finding ways to practice journalism 
without journalistic training. People like Wikileaks founder Julian Assange have the 
ability to produce news through non-traditional journalistic means. Granted, many 
people, like Assange, might not actually be journalists. Definitions of journalists need to 
begin to focus more on the practice of journalism than the employment status of a 
journalist. The privilege will quickly become outdated if the current definitions of 
journalists do not change. 
States will need to grapple with the problems of new media as Internet publishing 
continues to expand. States will need to update their laws to determine whether Internet 
journalists deserve the protections that traditional news media retain. Questions will also 
arise as to whether users of social media could invoke the privilege. These problems are 
not limited to issues of journalist’s privilege alone. As others have pointed out, the 
current state of media-related law has a variety of new challenges in the Internet age.
209
 
The law will remain relevant only if states begin adapting the laws they developed before 
the advent of the online world.  
Limitations 
 Every study has its limitations, and this study is no exception. Laws are not static. 
They are constantly being amended or repealed. They are always being interpreted and 
re-interpreted.  Therefore, the coded laws can represent only the information that was 
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 For examples see GANT, supra note 1; Michael Russo, Note, Are Bloggers Representative of the News 
Media Under the Freedom of Information Act? 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 225 (2006); Amy Bauer, 
Note, Blogging on Broken Glass: Why the Proposed Free Flow of Information Act Needs a Specific Test 
for Determining When Media Shield Laws Apply to Bloggers, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 747 (2009). Amy 
Kristin Sanders, Defining Defamation: Plaintiff Status in the Age of the Internet, 1 J. Media L. & Ethics 
155 (2009).  
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available at the time of the study. The values given to the various provisions could 
certainly change in future replications of this study as journalist’s privilege continues to 
evolve.  Content analysis is the process of simplifying complex information into 
manageable numbers. In the conversion process, detail is undoubtedly lost. Laws are 
complex and dependent on detail. A single number cannot always fully represent every 
dimension of a particular law. Even though I coded many provisions of journalist’s 
privilege, some information about each state’s law could have been lost. 
 Additionally, the research at hand was limited to the analysis of state appellate 
court decisions. State trial court decisions can also provide insight into how a state views 
media law. Granted, decisions of such courts are not always binding on the way state 
appellate courts interpret the law. Nonetheless, the decisions of those courts could 
provide useful insight into the law. 
Further Research 
 Future studies should continue to look at the relationships between policy 
liberalism and state media law. Further research into these relationships could develop 
stronger evidence that policy liberalism has an effect on media law. Research also needs 
to be conducted into individual states’ definitions of journalists. Many states did not have 
clear or precise definitions of who is eligible to invoke journalist’s privilege.  
Examinations of the legislative history of statutes, trial court opinions, and appellate court 
decisions related to other types of media law could provide better insight into who might 
be considered a journalist within a state. Research of this nature will become increasingly 
important. In a world where publishing simply requires an Internet connection, media 
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laws that were created before the existence of computers will have trouble remaining 
relevant.  
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Appendix A: Coding Scheme 
Coding Sheet 
 
STATE _______________________________________________________________ 
 
POLCULT 1=Individualistic, 2=Moralistic, 3=Traditionalistic.................................. ______ 
 
POL-LIB Policy liberalism scores................................................. KL______ EWM ______ 
 
SOURCE1 Source of protection for journalists is found in the U.S. Constitution:  
0=no, 2=yes………………………………………………………….… ______ 
 
SOURCE2 Source of protection for journalists is found in the state constitution: 
0=no, 2=yes……………………………………………………………. ______ 
 
SOURCE3 Source of protection for journalists is found in a state statute: 
0=no, 2=yes……………………………………………………………. ______ 
 
SOURCE4 Source of protection for journalists is found in state common law: 
0=no, 2=yes……………………………………………………….……. ______ 
 
SCOPE1 Does the law give the right to withhold the identity of a confidential source?  
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes………………………………….…………. ______ 
 
SCOPE2 Does the law give the right to withhold unpublished info even if it does  
not reveal the identity of a confidential source? 
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes ……………………………………..……… ______ 
 
SCOPE3 Does the law give the right to protect non-confidential sources?  
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes …………………………………………….. ______ 
 
SCOPE4 Does the law give the right to withhold personal observations? 
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes ………………………………………….… ______ 
 
CONTEXT1 Does the law give the right to withhold information from investigators or  
investigative bodies that have issued a subpoena?  
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes………………………………………………. ______ 
 
CONTEXT2 Does the law give the right to withhold information from legislative bodies?  
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes …………………………………...................... ______ 
 
CONTEXT3 Does the law give the right to withhold information from criminal 
defendants seeking it for their defense? 0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes …… ______ 
 
CONTEXT4 Does the law give the right to withhold information  
from parties to non-libel civil litigation? 0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes…… ______ 
 
CONTEXT5 Does the law give libel defendants a right to withhold info from plaintiffs  
needing to know the name of a source to pursue a claim?  
0=no, 1=it depends, 2=yes ……………………………………………… ______ 
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COVERS1 The law protects employees who work for newspapers that publish daily or  
weekly: 0=no, 2=yes………………………….………………………… ______ 
 
COVERS2 The law protects employees who work for other forms of print media:  
0=no, 2=yes…………………..................................................................... ______ 
 
COVERS3 The law protects employees who work for television media:  
0=no, 2=yes……………………………………………………………... ______ 
 
COVERS4 The law protects employees who work for radio media:  
0=no, 2=yes……………………………………………………………… ______ 
 
COVERS5 The law protects employees of internet only media:  
0=no, 2=yes………………….…………………………………..……… ______ 
 
COVERS6 The law protects freelancers who sell their material to established media: 
0=no, 2=yes………………….................................................................... ______ 
 
COVERS7 The law protects bloggers who do not work for established media: 
0=no, 2=yes…………………..................................................................... ______ 
 
COVERS8 The law protects students working for student media:  
0=no, 2=yes…………………………………………………….............. ______ 
 
COVERS9 The law protects book authors: 0=no, 2=yes…………………................ ______ 
 
COVERS10 The law protects academic researchers: 0=no, 2=yes……………...........  ______ 
 
COVERS11 The law protects issue activists: 0=no, 2=yes…………............................ ______ 
 
COVERS12 The law protects documentary filmmakers: 0=no, 2=yes…………….…  ______ 
 
COVERS13 The law protects other groups of people not previously mentioned: 
0=no, 2=yes………………….................................................................... ______ 
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Coding Instructions 
In the packet of information, you will be reading state laws and court opinions. As you 
read, please pay close attention to and note the following topics. Please feel free to code 
areas as you read. Some packets of information will contain several pages and coding 
only upon completion will not be sufficient.  
 
Some court opinions can contradict each other. If this situation exists, please code for the 
most recent interpretation. For example, if a court opinion determines that book authors 
receive journalist’s privilege in 2000, but another court opinion says that book authors do 
not receive journalist’s privilege in 2010, please code that book authors do not receive 
protection. 
 
If a situation arises whether it is unclear if a particular provision exists, please code that 
the provision as a 0. For example, if no court opinions or law have addressed whether 
unpublished information can be withheld from authorities, code that withholding 
unpublished material is not protected. 
 
1. STATE 
Each packet has a name of a state written on the upper right. Write the name of the state 
on the line.   
 
2. POLCULT 
Each packet has a political culture on the upper right corner. Write a 1 for an 
individualistic state. Write a 2 for a moralistic state. Write a 3 for a traditionalistic state. 
  
3. POL-LIB 
Each packet has two policy liberalism scores written on the upper right corner. One is 
labeled KL. The other is labeled EWM. Write the number on the appropriate line.  
 
4. SOURCE1 
If a court opinion indicates that a journalist’s privilege can be found in the United States 
Constitution, mark a 2. If the opinions do not find a basis for journalist’s privilege in the 
United States Constitution, mark a 0. 
 
5. SOURCE2 
If a court opinion indicates that a journalist’s privilege can be found in the state’s 
constitution, mark a 2. Also, if a constitutional amendment establishes a journalist’s 
privilege, mark a 2. If the opinions do not find a basis for journalist’s privilege in the 
state constitution or a constitutional amendment does not exist, mark a 0.  
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6. SOURCE3 
If a state statute, law, provision or code establishes a journalist’s privilege, mark a 2. If 
the state does not have a statute, law, provision or code present, mark 0.  
 
7. SOURCE4 
If a journalist’s privilege has been established through the common law, mark a 2. If 
there are no opinions finding a journalist’s privilege in other laws, mark a 0. 
 
8. SCOPE1 
 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege allows individuals to withhold the identities of 
confidential sources, mark a 2. Confidential sources are sources whose identity a 
journalist keeps secret in a news story. If some types of confidential sources are protected 
but others are not, mark a 1. If the privilege does not state that confidential sources are 
protected, mark a 0.   
 
9. SCOPE2 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege allows individuals to withhold unpublished information 
even if it does not reveal the identity of a confidential source, mark a 2. Unpublished 
information can include, but is not limited to, notes, photographs, recordings, video 
footage, outtakes and observations. If some types of unpublished information is protected 
but other types are not, mark a 1. If the privilege does not explicitly state unpublished 
information is protected, mark a 0.  
 
10. SCOPE3 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege allows individuals to protect non-confidential sources 
of information, mark a 2. If some types of non-confidential sources are protected but 
others are not, mark a 1. If the privilege only exists in situations where an individual 
explicitly makes a promise of confidentiality to a source, mark a 0. 
 
11. SCOPE 4 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege allows individuals to withhold information gathered 
from personal observations, mark a 2. If some types of personal observations are 
protected but others are not, mark a 1. If the privilege does not provide protection for an 
individual’s personal observations, mark a 0.  
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12. CONTEXT1 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege grants an absolute privilege to withhold information 
from people or bodies that have issued an investigative subpoena, mark a 2. Grand juries, 
prosecutors, and other types of investigators can issue investigative subpoenas. If the law 
provides a qualified privilege, mark a 1. If the law does not allow individuals to withhold 
information from bodies that issued an investigative subpoena, mark a 0. . 
 
 
13. CONTEXT2 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege grants an absolute privilege to withhold information 
from legislative bodies, mark a 2. A legislative body can include, but is not limited to, 
legislative sub-committee, committee, house of representatives, senate, assembly, or 
legislature. If the law provides a qualified privilege, mark a 1. If the law does not allow 
individuals to withhold information from legislative bodies, mark a 0. 
 
14. CONTEXT3 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege grants an absolute privilege to withhold information 
from criminal defendants seeking it for their defense, mark a 2. Most often, criminal 
defendants will be seeking the information from individuals during trial court 
proceedings. If the law provides a qualified privilege, mark a 1. If the law does not allow 
individuals to withhold information from criminal defendants, mark a 0. 
 
15. CONTEXT4 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege grants an absolute privilege to withhold information 
from parties to non-libel civil litigation, mark a 2. Non-libel civil litigation includes any 
type of non-criminal litigation other than defamation suits. Parties to this type of 
litigation can include individuals, groups, organizations, businesses and governments. If 
the law provides a qualified privilege, mark a 1. If the law does not allow individuals to 
withhold information from parties in non-criminal litigation, mark a 0. 
 
16. CONTEXT5 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege grants an absolute privilege to media defendants in 
libel suits a right to withhold information from plaintiffs needing the name of a source to 
pursue a claim, mark a 2. Libel suits are litigation concerning defamation in a print, 
broadcast or published medium. Typically, the media defendant is not the source of 
libelous information. Rather, the media defendant published alleged libelous statements 
from a source. As a result, the plaintiff is attempting to get information about the source 
from the defendant. If the law provides a qualified privilege, mark a 1. If the libel 
defendants are not able to withhold information from plaintiffs, mark a 0. 
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17. COVERS1 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects employees who work for newspapers, mark a 
2. An employee is a person who a newspaper business employs on a full-time or part-
time basis. This type of employment is different from newspapers hiring a freelance 
worker. If the law does not protect newspaper employees, mark a 0.  
 
18. COVERS2 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects employees who work for other forms of print 
media, mark a 2. Other forms of print media can include, but are not limited to, 
magazines, wire services, newsletters, brochures, flyers and posters. An employee is a 
person who the print media business officially employs on a full-time or part-time basis. 
This type of employment is different from businesses hiring a freelance worker. If the 
law does not protect employees of other print media, mark a 0. 
 
19. COVERS3 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects employees who work for television media, 
mark a 2. An employee is a person who a television station officially employs on a full or 
part-time basis. This type of employment is different from a station hiring a freelance 
worker. If the law does not protect television employees, mark a 0. 
 
20. COVERS4 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects employees who work for radio media, mark a 
2. An employee is a person who a radio station officially employs on a full or part-time 
basis. This type of employment is different from a station hiring a freelance worker. If the 
law does not protect radio employees, mark a 0.  
 
21. COVERS5 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects employees of Internet only media, mark a 2. 
Internet only media can include, but are not limited to, web sites, blogs, social media 
sites, electronic newsletters, podcasts and online videos. An employee is a person the 
online medium employs on a full or part-time basis. This type of employment is different 
from an online medium hiring a freelance worker. If the law does not protect employees 
of internet only media, mark a 0. 
 
22. COVERS6 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects freelancers who sell their work to established 
media, mark a 2. A freelancer is a person who is self-employed who creates media 
content. The freelancer then sells that content to media organizations. A freelancer is not 
committed to working for only one media organization on a long-term basis. If the law 
does not protect freelancers, mark a 0.  
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23. COVERS7 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects bloggers who do not work for established 
media, mark a 2. This type of blogger is a person that runs a blog independently of any 
media organization. The content of the blog can include factual reports. It can include a 
person’s own commentary and opinions. The content could not be construed to be 
reflective of any media organization. If the law does not protect bloggers, mark a 0.  
 
24. COVERS8 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects students working for student-run media, mark 
a 2. Students include, but are not limited to, people attending middle school, high school, 
colleges or universities. Student-run media are any publications for which students have 
primary control over the content. If the law does not protect students, mark a 0.  
 
25. COVERS9 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects book authors, mark a 2. A book author is any 
person that is collecting information with the intent to publish in book form. If the law 
does not protect book authors, mark a 0. 
 
26. COVERS10 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects academic researchers, mark a 2. Academic 
researchers can include, but are not limited to, professors, teachers, instructors, historians, 
scientists and students. These types of people collect information with the intent to add to 
existing knowledge. If the law does not protect academic researchers, mark a 0.  
 
27. COVERS11 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects issue activists, mark a 2. Issue activists include 
people who are associated with an interest or issue. These people are often pursuing 
specific goals. An activist will typically be gathering information specifically on the 
interest or issue with the intent to publish with a particular agenda. If the law does not 
protect issue activists, mark a 0.  
 
28. COVERS 12 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects documentary filmmakers, mark a 2. 
Documentary filmmakers are people who are collecting information to create a record of 
an event or to explore an issue in-depth. Documentary filmmakers typically use several 
interviews to gain the information they need. If the law does not protect documentary 
filmmakers, mark a 0.  
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29. COVERS13 
If the state’s journalist’s privilege protects other groups of people not previously 
mentioned, mark a 2. Please write the type of person protected on the coding sheet. If the 
law does not cover any groups beyond what has already been coded, mark a 0.  
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Appendix B: Coding Results 
Results of coding for the source of journalist’s privilege. 
State 
First 
Amendment 
State 
Constitution State Statute Common Law 
Index 
Score 
Alabama No No Yes No 2 
Alaska No No Yes No 2 
Arizona Yes No Yes No 4 
Arkansas No No Yes No 2 
California Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Colorado No No Yes No 2 
Connecticut No No Yes No 2 
Delaware No No Yes No 2 
Florida Yes No Yes No 4 
Georgia No No Yes No 2 
Hawaii No No No No 0 
Idaho Yes Yes No Yes 6 
Illinois Yes No Yes No 4 
Indiana No No Yes No 2 
Iowa Yes Yes No No 4 
Kansas Yes No Yes No 4 
Kentucky No No Yes No 2 
Louisiana Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Maine Yes No Yes No 4 
Maryland No No Yes No 2 
Massachusetts No No No Yes 2 
Michigan No No Yes No 2 
Minnesota No No Yes No 2 
Mississippi No No No No 0 
Missouri Yes No No No 2 
Montana No No Yes No 2 
Nebraska No No Yes No 2 
Nevada No No Yes No 2 
New Hampshire Yes Yes No No 4 
New Jersey No No Yes No 2 
New Mexico No No No Yes 2 
New York Yes Yes Yes No 6 
North Carolina No No Yes No 2 
North Dakota No No Yes No 2 
Ohio No No Yes No 2 
Oklahoma Yes No Yes No 4 
Oregon No No Yes No 2 
Pennsylvania Yes No Yes No 4 
Rhode Island No No Yes No 2 
South Carolina No No Yes No 2 
South Dakota No No No Yes 2 
Tennessee No No Yes No 2 
Texas Yes No Yes No 4 
Utah No No No Yes 2 
Vermont Yes No No No 2 
Virginia Yes No No No 2 
Washington No No Yes Yes 4 
West Virginia Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Wisconsin Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Wyoming No No No No 0 
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Results of coding for scope of privilege protections. 
State 
Confidential 
Source 
Unpublished 
Information 
Non-Confidential 
Source 
Personal 
Observations 
Index 
Score 
Alabama Yes No Yes No 4 
Alaska Yes No Yes No 4 
Arizona Yes No No No 2 
Arkansas Yes No Yes No 4 
California Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 
Colorado Yes Yes Yes Maybe 7 
Connecticut Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Delaware Yes Yes Yes Maybe 7 
Florida Yes Yes Yes Maybe 7 
Georgia Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Hawaii No No No No 0 
Idaho Yes No No No 2 
Illinois Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Indiana Yes No No No 2 
Iowa Yes Yes No No 4 
Kansas Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Kentucky Yes No Yes No 4 
Louisiana Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Maine Yes No No No 2 
Maryland Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Massachusetts Yes No No No 2 
Michigan Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Minnesota Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Mississippi No No No No 0 
Missouri Yes No No No 2 
Montana Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Nebraska Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Nevada Yes Yes Yes No 6 
New Hampshire Yes No No No 2 
New Jersey Yes Yes Yes Maybe 7 
New Mexico Yes No No No 2 
New York Yes Yes Yes No 6 
North Carolina Yes Yes Yes Maybe 7 
North Dakota Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Ohio Yes No Yes No 4 
Oklahoma Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Oregon  Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Pennsylvania Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Rhode Island Yes No No No 2 
South Carolina Yes Yes Yes No 6 
South Dakota Yes No No No 2 
Tennessee Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Texas Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Utah Yes Yes No No 4 
Vermont Yes No Yes No 4 
Virginia Yes No No No 2 
Washington Yes Yes Yes No 6 
West Virginia Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Wisconsin Yes Yes Yes No 6 
Wyoming No No No No 0 
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Results of coding for situations when privilege applies. 
State 
Investigatory 
Subpoenas 
Legislative 
Hearings 
Criminal 
Defendants 
Non-Party Civil 
Litigation 
Defamation 
Litigation 
Index 
Score 
Alabama Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute 10 
Alaska Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
Arizona Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute 10 
Arkansas Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
California Absolute Absolute Qualified Absolute Qualified 8 
Colorado Qualified None Qualified Qualified Qualified 4 
Connecticut None Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 4 
Delaware Absolute Absolute Qualified Qualified Qualified 7 
Florida Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
Georgia Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified None 4 
Hawaii None None None None None 0 
Idaho Qualified None Qualified Qualified Qualified 4 
Illinois None None Qualified Qualified Qualified 3 
Indiana Absolute Absolute Qualified Absolute Absolute 9 
Iowa None None None Qualified None 1 
Kansas None Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 4 
Kentucky Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute 10 
Louisiana Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
Maine Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
Maryland Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
Massachusetts Qualified None Qualified Qualified Qualified 4 
Michigan Absolute None Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
Minnesota Qualified Absolute Qualified Absolute Qualified 7 
Mississippi None None None None None 0 
Missouri None None None None Qualified 1 
Montana Absolute None Absolute Absolute Absolute 8 
Nebraska Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute Absolute 10 
Nevada Absolute Absolute Qualified Absolute Absolute 9 
New Hampshire None None Qualified Qualified Qualified 3 
New Jersey Absolute Absolute Qualified Absolute Absolute 9 
New Mexico Qualified None Qualified Qualified Qualified 4 
New York Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
North Carolina Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
North Dakota Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
Ohio Absolute Absolute Qualified Absolute Absolute 9 
Oklahoma Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified None 4 
Oregon  Absolute Absolute Qualified Absolute Qualified 7 
Pennsylvania Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
Rhode Island Qualified None Qualified Qualified None 3 
South Carolina None Qualified Qualified Qualified None 3 
South Dakota None None None None Qualified 1 
Tennessee Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified None 4 
Texas Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
Utah None None Qualified Qualified Qualified 3 
Vermont None None Qualified None None 1 
Virginia None None Qualified None None 1 
Washington Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified Qualified 5 
West Virginia Qualified None Qualified Qualified Qualified 4 
Wisconsin Qualified Absolute Qualified Qualified Qualified 6 
Wyoming None None None None None 0 
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Results of coding for who can invoke journalist’s privilege. 
Type of journalist States 
 
Newspaper employees: 
 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, West, Virginia, Wisconsin 
 
Other print media employees: 
 
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin 
 
Television media employees: 
 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin 
 
Radio media employees: 
 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin 
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Type of journalist 
 
States 
 
Internet-only media employees: 
 
Arkansas, California, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas, Washington 
 
Freelance journalists: 
 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin 
 
Independent bloggers: 
 
No states 
 
Student journalists: 
 
Maryland, West Virginia 
 
Book authors: 
 
Connecticut, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas,  
Washington, Wisconsin 
 
Academic researchers: 
 
Delaware, Texas 
 
Issue activists: 
 
California 
 
Documentary filmmakers: 
 
Alaska, Illinois, Louisiana 
 
Other potential journalists: 
 
New Jersey 
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Appendix C: Journalist’s Privilege by State 
Alabama 
 
State Shield Statute:  
 
Ala. Code § 12-21-142 (2012)  
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege. 
 
Description: 
 
 Alabama’s shield statute provides an absolute privilege for journalists to protect 
sources of published information.
210
 The statute does not distinguish between confidential 
and non-confidential sources. The statute provides protection in any legal proceeding or 
trial and before any court, grand jury, tribunal, or legislative committee.
211
 The statute 
grants protection to journalists for newspapers, radio stations, and television news 
stations.
212
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit construed the 
statute very literally when it refused to provide protection to a magazine reporter.
213
 The 
Alabama state appellate courts have not interpreted the shield statute. The state appellate 
courts have also not addressed whether a basis for journalist’s privilege is found in the 
First Amendment or state constitution. Alabama falls within the jurisdiction of the 
Eleventh Circuit which has recognized a qualified journalist’s privilege in the First 
Amendment.
214
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
210
 ALA. CODE §12-21-142. 
211
 Id. 
212
 Id. 
213
 Price v. Time, 416 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005). 
214
 See Id. 
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Alaska 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Alaska Stat. § 09.25.300 – 09.25.390 (2013)  
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Coney v. State, 699 P.2d 899 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) 
 
Description: 
 
 Alaska’s state statute provides a qualified privilege for journalists to protect a 
“source of information”215 used while acting in the course of their duties as a journalist. 
The privilege can be overturned if the journalist’s lack of testimony would “result in the 
miscarriage of justice or the denial of a fair trial to those who challenge the privilege”216 
or “be contrary to the public interest.”217 The only state appellate court case to discuss 
journalist’s privilege, Coney v. State, stated that “a newspaper reporter’s privilege is 
limited and must give way to more important constitutional values, such as a defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.”218The appellate court held that the trial judge did not err in refusing 
to require a journalist to provide testimony to a criminal defendant in that particular 
situation, though.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
215
 ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.300 
216
 ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.310 
217
 Id.  
218
 Coney v. State, 699 P.2d 899, 902 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) 
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Arizona 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2237 (LexisNexis 2013) 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §12-2214 (LexisNexis 2013) (describes the requirements for subpoena of 
media witnesses)  
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Flores v. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co., 218 Ariz. 52, 178 P.3d 1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) 
State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 94 P.3d 1119, (Ariz., 2004) 
Matera v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, 170 Ariz. 446, 825 P.2d 971 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)  
Bartlett v. Superior Court In and For Pima County, 150 Ariz. 178, 722 P.2d 346 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1986).  
 
Description: 
 
 Arizona’s shield statute provides an absolute privilege for journalists to protect 
confidential sources of information. The statute does not provide protection for non-
confidential sources. The statute also states that the absolute privilege to protect 
confidential sources applies in “a legal proceeding or trial or any proceeding whatever.” 
The Arizona courts have refused to extend the privilege to a book author.
219
 The court 
explained the plain language of the statute protects journalists only for newspapers, radio 
and television.
220
 Journalists in Arizona also have a qualified privilege found in the First 
Amendment. Once again, the privilege only applies to confidential sources of 
information.
221
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
219
 Matera v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, 170 Ariz. 446, 825 P.2d 971 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1992) 
220
 Id. 
221
 See Id.; Bartlett v. Superior Court In and For Pima County, 150 Ariz. 178, 722 P.2d 346 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1986). 
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Arkansas 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-85-510 (West 2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (Ark. 1978) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Arkansas shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege. The 
privilege can be overcome if a party can be shown that an article “was written, published, 
or broadcast in bad faith, with malice, and not in the interest of the public welfare.”222 
The statute also explicitly provides protection for journalists of Internet news.
223
 The 
statute states that journalists cannot be required to disclose a source “to any grand jury or 
to any other authority.” 224 The only case to address the statute stated that “any other 
authority” includes both civil and criminal proceedings.225 The state appellate courts have 
not addressed whether the privilege extends protections beyond a source of information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
California 
                                                     
222
 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-85-510. 
223
 Id. 
224
 Id. 
225
 Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (Ark. 1978). 
93 
 
 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Cal. Evid. Code § 1070 (2013) 
Cal. Const. art. I § 2 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
McGarry v. University of San Diego, 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007) 
O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006) 
People v. Vasco, 131 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) 
People v. Ramos, 34 Cal. 4th 137, 101 P.3d 478, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575 (Cal. 2005) 
Fost v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 4th 724, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) 
Miller v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 883, 986 P.2d 170, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 384 (Cal. 1999) 
Rancho Publication v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1999) 
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 79 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
SCI-Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 4th 654, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1997) 
In re Willon, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1080, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 
People v. Sanchez, 12 Cal. 4th 1, 906 P.2d 1129, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Cal. 1996) 
People v. Von Villas, 10 Cal. App. 4th 201, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) 
People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 809 P.2d 865, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90 (Cal. 1991) 
New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 
(Cal. 1990) 
Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (Cal. 1990) 
Hallissy v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 248 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1988) 
Dalitz v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 168 Cal. App. 3d 468, 214 Cal. Rptr. 254 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1985) 
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (Cal. 1984) 
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
Fisher v. Larsen, 138 Cal. App. 3d 627, 188 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) 
KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) 
Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1979) 
CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1978) 
Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) 
Farr. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) 
 
Description: 
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 California’s shield statute and state constitution both provide journalists with 
absolute protections for sources and unpublished information.
226
 The statute does not 
grant a privilege, though. Rather, the statute prevents any authority from finding a 
journalist in contempt for refusing to disclose information. The statute itself protects 
traditional journalists. California state appellate courts have extended the privilege to 
Internet journalists
227
 and the journalistic activities of issue activists.
228
 The California 
Supreme Court has also stated that a journalist’s eyewitness observations in public are 
protected from disclosure.
229
 In the same case, the court also stated a criminal defendant’s 
constitutional rights to a fair trial could potentially overcome the absolute shield.
230
 In 
criminal cases, though, journalists are absolutely protected from prosecutors seeking 
information.
231
 As stated previously, the statute provides journalists immunity from 
contempt charges. Therefore, journalists do not have much protection in defamation 
cases. If a journalist refuses to disclose information, a court can use other sanctions, such 
as a summary judgment, for a journalist’s failure to disclose information.232 The 
California Supreme Court has also held that the First Amendment does provide 
journalists with a qualified reporter’s privilege.233 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
226
 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070; CAL. CONST. art. I § 2. 
227
 O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
228
 Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 597 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
229
 Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789 P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (Cal. 1990). 
230
 Id., at 765. 
231
 Miller v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 883, 986 P.2d 170, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 384 (Cal. 1999). 
232
 New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 (Cal. 1990). 
233
 Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (Cal. 1984). 
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Colorado 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Colo. Rev. Stat. 13-90-119 (2012) 
Colo. Rev. Stat. 24-72.5-101 – 106 (2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Gordon v. Boyles, 9 P.3d 1106 (Colo., 2000)  
Henderson v. People, 879 P.2d 383 (Colo., 1994)  
People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo., 1993) 
Gagnon v. District Court In and For Fremont County, 632 P.2d 567 (Colo., 1981) 
Pankratz v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver, 199 Colo. 411, 609 
P.2d 1101 (Colo., 1980) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Colorado shield statute provides a qualified privilege for journalists to protect 
news information. News information includes, but is not limited to, sources, observations, 
documents, photographs and knowledge. The privilege does not apply to information 
received at a press conference, published information, personal observations of crimes in 
instances when no other witnesses are available, or personal observations of a class 1, 2, 
or 3 felony.
234
 Also, the privilege is codified in two different statutes. C.R.S. 13-90-119 
applies to judicial proceedings. A separate, similarly worded statute applies to 
governmental administrative proceedings.
235
 The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that 
there is no basis for journalist’s privilege found in the First Amendment or state 
constitution.
236
 Although, a more recent decision implied that the First Amendment does 
provide protection. The court did not make an explicit statement indicating as much.
237
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
234
 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119. 
235
 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72.5-101 – 106. 
236
 See Pankratz v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver, 199 Colo. 411, 609 P.2d 1101 
(Colo. 1980); Gagnon v. District Court In and For Fremont County, 632 P.2d 567 (Colo. 1981). 
237
 Gordon v. Boyles, 9 P.3d 1106 (Colo. 2000). 
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Connecticut 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146t (2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege. 
 
Description: 
 
 The Connecticut shield statute provides a qualified privilege for journalists. The 
statute protects both information and sources. Information can include notes, outtakes, 
film or “other data of whatever sort in any medium.”238 The statute also provides 
protection for news media that publish through electronic means. This provision would 
likely protect Internet news media, but no state appellate court has addressed the issue. 
The statute also states that confidentiality is not a requirement for protection. The 
privilege also establishes a multi-step process to overturn the privilege. A party that 
wants to issue a subpoena must first negotiate with the targeted news media to receive 
requested information.
239
 If a deal is not made, then the party seeking a subpoena must 
establish through other sources that a crime has occurred or a civil action can be 
sustained. Then the party must establish that the information or identity of the source is 
critical or necessary, not obtainable through other means, and there is an overriding 
public interest in the disclosure.
240
 After all the steps, a court can then require a journalist 
to testify. No state appellate courts have ruled on journalist’s privilege. One published 
trial court decision did suggest that the First Amendment provides a journalist’s privilege 
in the state.
241
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
238
 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t(a)(1). 
239
 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t (c).  
240
 CONN. GEN. STAT. §52-146t(d).  
241
 Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Fagin, 33 Conn. Supp. 204, 370 A.2d 1095 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1976).  
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Delaware 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Del.Code Ann. tit. 10 § 4320 to 4326 (2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege.  
 
Description: 
 
The Delaware shield statute provides an absolute testimonial privilege for 
journalists in nonadjudicative proceedings.
242
 The statute also provides a qualified 
privilege in all adjudicative proceedings.
243
 The statute specifically states that grand jury 
proceedings are not considered adjudicative proceedings. The statute also provides 
protection for journalists, scholars, educators, polemicists, or any individual who meets a 
minimum number of hours engaged in newsgathering activity.
 244
 In adjudicative 
proceedings, journalists can invoke the privilege if they swear under oath that disclosure 
would violate an agreement with the source so that the information could be obtained. 
The journalist could also swear that disclosure would hinder the cultivation of source 
relationships.
245
 The privilege for the content of information can be overturned if a judge 
determines that the public interest of the testimony outweighs the public interest of the 
maintenance of confidential information. Also, the privilege to protect the source or 
content can be overturned if a preponderance of evidence shows that the reporter’s sworn 
statement is false.
246
 No state appellate courts have specifically addressed the Delaware 
shield statute or a constitutionally-based journalist’s privilege.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
242
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4321. 
243
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4322. 
244
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4320. 
245
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4322. 
246
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4323. 
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Florida 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.5015 (LexisNexis 2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
WTVJ-NBC 6 v. Shehadeh, 56 So. 3d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 
TheStreet.com, Inc. v. Carroll, 20 So. 3d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) 
News-Journal Corp. v. Carson, 741 So. 2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
Ulrich v. Coast Dental Services, Inc., 739 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1999) 
Morris Communications Corp. v. Frangie, 720 So. 2d 230 (Fla., 1998) 
Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 2d 670 (Fla., 1998) 
State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220 (Fla., 1998) 
Morris Communications Corp. v Frangie, 704 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
Kidwell v. State, 696 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) 
Davis v. State, 692 So. 2d 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) 
Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v. State, 669 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
Tampa Television, Inc. v. Norman, 647 So. 2d 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) 
Investigation: Florida Statute 27.04, Subpoena of Roche v. State, 589 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
CBS, Inc. v. Jackson, 578 So. 2d 698 (Fla., 1991) 
Russell v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 570 So. 2d 979 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) 
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577 (Fla., 1990) 
CBS, Inc. v. Cobb, 536 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) 
Miami Herald Pub.. Co., a Div. of Knight-Ridder, Inc. v. Morejon, 529 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
Carroll Contracting, Inc. v. Edwards, 528 So. 2d 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) 
Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722 (Fla., 1986) 
Satz v. News and Sun-Sentinel Co., 484 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) 
Kridos v. Vinskus, 483 So. 2d 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) 
Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 463 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) 
Johnson v. Bentley, 457 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)  
Tribune Co. v. Green, 440 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) 
Gadsden County Times, Inc. v. Horne, 426 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) 
Times Pub. Co. v. Burke, 375 So. 2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) 
Campus Communications, Inc. v. Freedman, 374 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) 
Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla., 1976) 
In re Tierney, 328 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) 
Laughlin v. State, 323 So. 2d 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) 
Morgan v. State, 325 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) 
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Description: 
 
 The Florida shield statute provides journalists a qualified privilege to protect 
sources and information.
247
 The statute defines professional journalists broadly but 
specifically excludes book authors.
248
 A Florida appellate court has also recognized that 
website publishers and Internet journalists are protected under the statutory privilege.
249
 
The statute provides protection for both information and the identity of a source. It does 
not make a distinction between confidential or non-confidential information. The statute 
also specifically states that protection does not apply to physical evidence, eyewitness 
observations or recordings of crimes.
250
 Journalists’ observations of non-criminal activity 
are protected as long as the journalist was performing journalistic duties.
251
 A court can 
overturn the qualified privilege if a party can demonstrate that the information sought is 
relevant and material to unresolved issues in a proceeding, unavailable from other 
sources, and a compelling interest exists to require disclosure.
252
 The Florida Supreme 
Court has also specifically stated that the privilege applies in both criminal and civil 
proceedings.
253
 The Florida Supreme Court has also found a basis for a qualified 
reporter’s privilege in the First Amendment.254 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
247
 FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2).  
248
 FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(1). 
249
 TheStreet.com, Inc. v. Carroll, 20 So.3d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
250
 News Journal Corp. v. Carson, 741 So.2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).  
251
 Id. 
252
 FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2). 
253
 Morris Communications Corp. v. Frangie, 720 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1998). 
254
 Morgan v. State, 337 So.2d 951 (Fla. 1976). 
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Georgia 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Ga. Code Ann. § 24-5-508 (2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 715 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) 
In re Morris Communications Co., 258 Ga. App. 154, 573 S.E.2d 420 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2002) 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 251 Ga. App. 808, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2001) 
In re Paul, 270 Ga. 280, 513 S.E.2d 219 (Ga. 1999) 
Nobles v. State, 201 Ga. App. 483, 411 S.E.2d 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) 
Stripling v. State, 261 Ga. 1, 401 S.E.2d 500 (Ga. 1991) 
Howard v. Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc., 259 Ga. 795, 387 S.E.2d 332 (Ga. 
1990) 
Vaughn v. State, 259 Ga. 325, 381 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1989) 
Georgia Communications Corp. BA-145 v. Horne, 164 Ga. App. 227, 294 S.E.2d 725 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1982) 
 
Description: 
 
 Georgia’s shield statute provides journalists a qualified privilege to protect any 
information gained during news gathering activities. The shield provides protections for 
journalists at newspapers, radio stations, television stations, and magazines as well as 
book authors. The statute also provides protection for people who publish through 
electronic means.
255
 Thus, the statute likely protects Internet journalists, but a state 
appellate court has not addressed the issue. The statute also specifically states that the 
privilege only applies in situations where journalists are not a party.
256
 The Court of 
Appeals of Georgia has stated that public policy does require a balancing test to 
determine whether confidential sources must be revealed in defamation suits, though.
257
 
The journalist’s privilege can be overturned when the requested information is material 
and relevant, alternative means to gain the information is unavailable, and the 
information is necessary to prepare for or present a case.
258
 The Georgia Supreme Court 
has found that the statute applies whether the journalist’s information was confidential or 
non-confidential.
259
 Finally, the Georgia appellate courts have not found a basis for a 
journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment or Georgia state constitution.  
 
 
                                                     
255
 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-508. 
256
 Id. 
257
 Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 251 Ga. App. 808, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). 
258
 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-508. 
259
 In re Paul, 270 Ga. 280, 513 S.E.2d 219 (Ga. 1999). 
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Hawaii 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
On June 30, 2013, the Hawaii shield statute expired because of a sunset clause. Hawaii 
does not have a state shield statute.  
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege since 1964. 
 
Description: 
 
 The Hawaii legislature enacted a shield statute in 2008. The statute included a 
sunset clause that would cause the statute to expire unless the state legislature passed an 
extension. The legislature did not come to an agreement on extending the shield statute 
which caused it to expire on June 30, 2013.
260
 The Hawaii state appellate courts have not 
addressed journalist’s privilege since 1961. In the 1961 case, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
found that the First Amendment did not provide protection for confidential sources of 
information.
261
 Hawaii falls under the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized a qualified journalist’s 
privilege in the First Amendment.
262
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
260
 Jack Komperda, Hawaii Shield Law Will Expire after Lawmakers Unable to Reconcile Competing Bills, 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (May 3, 2013), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-
resources/news/hawaii-shield-law-will-expire-after-lawmakers-unable-reconcile-compe. 
261
 In re Goodfader, 45. Haw. 317, 367 P.2d 472 (Haw., 1961). 
262
 See Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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Idaho 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Idaho does not have a state shield statute. 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
State v. Salsbury, 129 Idaho 307, 924 P.2d 208 (Idaho, 1996) 
Matter of Contempt of Wright, 108 Idaho 418, 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho, 1985) 
Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560, 671 P.2d 473 (Idaho, 1983) 
Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc., 101 Idaho 795, 623 P.2d 103 
(Idaho, 1980). 
Caldero v. Tribune Pub. Co., 98 Idaho 288, 565 P.2d 791 (Idaho, 1977) 
 
Description: 
 
Idaho has not enacted a state shield statute. The Idaho Supreme Court has found 
the basis for a qualified journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment, Idaho Constitution, 
and common law.
263
 The supreme court has addressed only the privilege in relation to 
newspaper and television journalists. It has not specifically defined who is considered a 
journalist. A court can overturn the qualified privilege if the party seeking information 
meets all three prongs of Justice Stewart’s test laid out in Branzburg.264 The supreme 
court has expressly stated that the type of case must play a factor during a balancing test. 
In criminal cases that involve Sixth Amendment rights, disclosure should be more 
heavily favored.
265
 The Idaho Supreme Court has also noted that most Idaho cases have 
focused on confidential sources or confidential information. When confidentiality is not 
at stake, the court has been hesitant to provide a privilege for journalists.
266
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
263
 Matter of Contempt of Wright, 108 Idaho 418, 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho 1985). 
264
 Id., at 423.  
265
 Id. 
266
 State v. Salsbury, 129 Idaho 307, 924 P.2d 208 (Idaho 1996). 
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Illinois 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-901 – 5/8-909 (LexisNexis 2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
People v. Slover, 323 Ill. App. 3d 620, 753 N.E.2d 554, 257 Ill. Dec. 359 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2001) 
People v. Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill. 2d 177, 724 N.E.2d 901, 244 Ill. Dec. 13 (Ill. 2000) 
Cukier v. American Medical Ass’n, 259 Ill. App. 3d 159, 630 N.E.2d 1198, 197 Ill. Dec. 
74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) 
People v. Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 607 N.E.2d 1375, 180 Ill. Dec. 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1993) 
In re Arya, 226 Ill. App. 3d 848, 589 N.E.2d 832, 168 Ill. Dec. 432 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) 
In re Special Grand Jury Investigation of Alleged Violation of Juvenile Court Act, 104 
Ill. 2d 419, 472 N.E.2d 450, 84 Ill. Dec. 490 (Ill., 1984) 
People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 87 Ill. 2d 167, 429 N.E.2d 483, 57 Ill. Dec. 585 (Ill., 
1981) 
People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 412 N.E.2d 692, 45 Ill. Dec. 341 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980) 
People v. Childers, 94 Ill. App. 3d 104, 418 N.E.2d 959, 49 Ill. Dec. 939 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1981) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Illinois shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to protect 
the source of any information.
267
 The statute defines a source as “the person or means 
from or through which the news or information was obtained.”268 An Illinois appellate 
court has used this definition to extend protection beyond just the identity of a source. 
The court found that photographs could also be considered a source of information.
269
 
The statute also states that a reporter is considered any person engaged in collecting, 
writing or editing news on a full or part-time basis that will be published in a news 
medium. The statute does state that a news medium does include electronic 
publication,
270
 but the state appellate courts have not addressed whether Internet 
publications receive protection. A court can overturn the privilege if it decides that the 
reporter’s information does not concern matters that state and federal law require to be 
secret, such as educational  or health records.The court must also find that other sources 
are unavailable and disclosure is in the public interest. In defamation cases, the privilege 
can be overturned if all other sources have been exhausted and the plaintiff’s need for the 
information outweighs the public interest in the journalist’s protection of confidential 
                                                     
267
 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901. 
268
 Id. 
269
 People v. Slover, 323 Ill.App.3d 620, 753 N.E.2d 554, 257 Ill. Dec. 359 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
270
 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-902.  
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sources.
271
 The Illinois Supreme Court has found that the public interest in the proper 
operations of a grand jury is enough to overturn the qualified privilege.
272
 The court’s 
holding casts doubt on whether journalist’s privilege could apply in any grand jury 
situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
271
 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907. 
272
 People v. Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill.2d 177, 724 N.E.2d 901, 244 Ill. Dec. 13 (Ill. 2000). 
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Indiana 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Ind. Code Ann. § 34-46-4-1 – 34-46-4-1 (LexisNexis 2013) 
  
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
In re Indiana Newspapers Inc., 963 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) 
In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1998) 
Klagiss v. State, 585 N.E.2d 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) 
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Stearns v. Zulka, 489 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) 
Hitt v. State, 478 N.E.2d 65 (Ind. 1985) 
Jamerson v. Anderson Newspapers, Inc., 469 N.E. 2d 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) 
Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Bradley, 462 N.E.2d 1321 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) 
Shindler v. State, 166 Ind. App. 258, N.E.2d 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) 
Hestand v. State, 257 Ind. 191, N.E.2d 282 (Ind. 1971) 
Lipps v. State, 254 Ind. 141, 258 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. 1970) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Indiana shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to 
protect confidential sources of information.
273
 The statute protects journalists working for 
newspapers, periodicals, press associations, wire services, television stations, and radio 
stations.
274
 The statute specifically states that it only protects sources of information. The 
statute is not clear whether a journalist must promise confidentiality. The Indiana state 
appellate courts have differed on whether the First Amendment provides a basis for a 
journalist’s privilege. In a civil case, the Indiana Court of Appeals for the third district 
found that First Amendment did provide journalists with a qualified privilege to protect 
unpublished information.
275
 In a later criminal case, though, the Indiana Supreme Court 
found that the journalists did not have a First Amendment basis for a journalist’s 
privilege to protect unaired footage from a known source.
276
 The supreme court did not 
address whether its decision would also apply to civil cases, thus, the case law is not 
entirely settled.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
273
 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-2.  
274
 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-1.  
275
 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Stearns v. Zulka, 489 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
276
 In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1998). 
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Iowa 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Iowa does not a have a state shield statute. 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Community College, 646 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 
2002)  
Bell v. City of Des Moines, 412 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 1987) 
Lamberto v. Bown, 326 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1982) 
Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977) 
 
Description: 
 
 Iowa does not have a state shield statute. Rather, the Iowa Supreme Court has 
recognized a journalist’s privilege through interpreting the Iowa Constitution and First 
Amendment.
277
 The court has adopted a three-prong test to determine whether the 
journalist’s privilege can be overturned. A court can overturn the privilege if a party can 
show that the information is critical to the action or defense, other means to gain the 
information have been exhausted, and the record shows that the action or defense is not 
frivolous.
278
 The court has also specifically stated that privilege protects confidential 
sources, unpublished information and journalist’s notes.279 The Iowa Supreme Court has 
applied the privilege only in civil proceedings. It has suggested that the privilege does 
apply in criminal proceedings, though.
280
 The court has not specifically defined who 
qualifies as a journalist. Newspaper and television journalists have been able to invoke 
the privilege successfully.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
277
 Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa, 1977). 
278
 Id., at 852.  
279
 Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Community College, 646 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Iowa 2002). 
280
 Winegard, at 852.  
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Kansas 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-480 – 60-485 (2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan., 1978) 
Pennington v. Chaffee, 1 Kan. App. 2d 682, 573 P.2d 1099 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Kansas shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to protect 
any information or the source of any information obtained during journalistic duties.
281
 
The statute protects journalists for newspapers, magazines, news wire services, television 
stations and radio stations. The statute also specifically protects online journals that 
regularly gather and publish news.
282
 The statute protects journalists’ notes, photographs, 
outtakes, tapes and other recordings.
283
 The shield statute also does not distinguish 
between confidential and non-confidential information. A court can overturn the privilege 
if the party seeking the information shows that the information is material and relevant, 
unavailable through other means, and of compelling interest to the case.
284
 The Kansas 
Supreme Court also found a limited privilege based in the First Amendment.
285
 The 
protections found in the shield statute likely provide broader protections than what the 
supreme court initially recognized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
281
 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-481. 
282
 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-480.  
283
 Id. 
284
 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-482. 
285
 State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1978). 
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Kentucky 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
The Lexington Herald-Leader Co. v. Beard, 690 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1985) 
Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971) 
Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Kentucky shield statute provides an absolute privilege for journalists to 
protect a source of information.
286
 The statute does not make a distinction between 
confidential or non-confidential sources. The statute also protects journalists in “any legal 
proceeding or trial” as well as before a grand jury, the General Assembly, or any city or 
county legislative body. The statute expressly protects only journalists working for 
newspapers, radio, or television.
287
 The state appellate courts have not recognized a 
journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment or state constitution. The appellate courts 
have narrowly construed the shield statute to protect only the source from which 
information was obtained. The shield statute does not protect the actual information 
itself.
288
 Journalists also do not have a shield privilege when they personally witness the 
commission of a crime.
289
 The Kentucky appellate courts have found that the shield 
statute does not protect a journalist from being required to appear before a grand jury.
290
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
286
 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 
287
 Id. 
288
 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970). 
289
 Id. 
290
 Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971). 
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Louisiana 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
La. Rev. Stat. § 45:1451 – 1459 (2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ridenhour), 520 So.2d 372 (La. 1988) 
In re Burns, 484 So.2d 658 (La. 1986) 
Becnel v. Lucia, 420 So. 2d 1173 (La. Ct. App. 1982) 
Dumez v. Houma Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Bd., 341 So.2d 1206 (La. Ct. 
App. 1977) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Louisiana shield statute provides a qualified privilege for journalists to 
protect the source of any information. The statute does not distinguish between 
confidential or non-confidential sources.
291
 A party seeking to overturn the privilege must 
provide a written statement to the journalist explaining why disclosure of a source is 
required for the protection of the public’s interest. A court is then required to hear 
testimony from all parties. After testimony, a court can decide whether disclosure is 
essential to the public interest.
292
 The statute also provides a qualified privilege to 
journalists for non-confidential news information. The privilege can be overturned if a 
party can show the information wanted is highly material and relevant, critical to a 
party’s claim, defense, or issue, and is not obtainable from any other sources.293 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court also stated that a qualified privilege for journalists to protect 
information is found in both the First Amendment and state constitution. Courts can make 
an exception when the journalist has witnessed criminal activity.
294
 The supreme court 
has also interpreted that state statute as protecting any information that could potentially 
identify a source of information.
295
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
291
 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1452. 
292
 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1453. 
293
 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1459.  
294
 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ridenhour), 520 So.2d 372 (La. 1988). 
295
 In re Burns, 484 So.2d 658 (La. 1986). 
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Maine 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 16 § 61 (2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
In re Letellier, 578 A.2d 722 (Me. 1990) 
State v. Hohler, 543 A.2d 364 (Me. 1988)  
 
Description: 
 
 Maine’s shield statute provides journalists with a qualified testimonial privilege to 
protect confidential sources.
296
 The shield statute simply states that journalists receive 
shield protection without specifically defining who is a journalist. The statute also 
protects any information that identifies a confidential source or any information 
journalists received in confidence while in a journalistic capacity.
297
 A court can require 
disclosure of a confidential source after a multi-prong test. The identity of the source 
must be material and relevant, must be critical to a claim or defense, is not obtainable 
through other means, and an overriding public interest in disclosure must exist.
298
 In 
criminal investigations or prosecution, the government must also show through other 
sources that reasonable grounds exist to believe a crime has occurred. In civil 
proceedings a party must also show through other sources that a prima facie cause of 
action exists.
299
 Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court has acknowledged that the First 
Amendment does provide protection through a case-by-case balancing test.
300
 The 
potential harm to the free flow of information must be balanced against the need for the 
requested information.
301
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
296
 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16 § 61. 
297
 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16 § 61(1).  
298
 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16 § 61 (2)(A). 
299
 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16 § 61 (2)(B).  
300
 In re Letellier, 578 A.2d 722 (Me. 1990). 
301
 Id., at 726.  
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Maryland 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Forensic Advisors, Inc. v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 170 Md. App. 520, 907 A.2d 855 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) 
Prince George’s County v. Hartley, 150 Md. App. 581, 822 A.2d 537 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2003) 
WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp. v. State, 300 Md. 233, 477 A.2d 776 (Md. 1984) 
In re State of Cal. for Los Angeles County, Grand Jury Investigation, 57 Md. App. 804, 
471 A.2d 1141 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) 
Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165, 465 A.2d 413 (Md. 1983) 
Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 43 Md. App. 560, 406 A.2d 652 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1979) 
Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) 
State v. Sheridan, 248 Md. 320, 236 A.2d 18 (Md. 1967)  
 
Description: 
 
 The Maryland shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to 
protect sources and a qualified privilege to protect unpublished information.
302
 The 
statute provides protection to traditional journalists as well as student journalists.
303
 A 
Maryland appellate court has extended the privilege to Internet news media.
304
 The 
statute states that journalists can protect sources whether or not a promise of 
confidentiality was made.
305
 The court can overturn the privilege for unpublished 
information if a party can show that the information is relevant to a significant legal 
issue, could not be obtained through any other means, and disclosure is in the public’s 
overriding interest.
306
 The statute states that a court cannot require a journalist to disclose 
the source of any information.
307
 The Maryland state appellate courts have interpreted 
journalist’s privilege only through the shield statute. The courts have not found an 
additional basis for journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment or state constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
302
 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(C). 
303
 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(a)-(b). 
304
 Forensic Advisors, Inc. v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 170 Md. App. 520, 907 A.2d 855 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
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Massachusetts 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Massachusetts does not have a state shield statute.  
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, 442 Mass. 367, 822 N.E.2d 667 (Mass. 2005) 
Wojcik v. Boston Herald, Inc., 60 Mass. App. Ct. 510, 803 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2004) 
Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 706 N.E.2d 316 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1999) 
Promulgation of Rules Regarding Protection of Confidential News Sources, 395 Mass. 
164, 479 N.E.2d 154 (Mass. 1985) 
Com. v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1, 438 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 1982) 
Matter of Roche, 381 Mass. 624, 411 N.E.2d 466 (Mass. 1980) 
Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1973) 
In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Massachusetts legislature has not enacted a state shield statute. The state 
appellate courts have also been reluctant to find a basis for a journalist’s privilege in the 
First Amendment or state constitution. Rather, the courts have developed protections for 
journalists through the common law. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has 
emphasized a balancing test between the public’s interest in the need of every person’s 
evidence and the protection of the free flow of information.
308
 The court did not 
specifically establish what factors must be considered in the balancing test. The situations 
in which courts have granted protection for journalists have typically involved 
confidential sources.
309
 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has found that 
published information from a known source does not receive protection, though.
310
 
Massachusetts state appellate courts have provided protection in the context of grand 
juries,
311
 criminal proceedings,
312
 non-libel civil litigation
313
 and libel litigation when the 
media was a party.
314
  
 
                                                     
308
 Promulgation of Rules Regarding Protection of Confidential News Sources, 395 Mass. 164, 479 N.E.2d 
154 (Mass. 1985). 
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 See Wojcik v. Boston Herald, Inc., 60 Mass. App. Ct. 510, 803 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); 
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 Matter of John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 410 Mass. 596, 574 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 1991). 
312
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 Sinnott v. Boston Retirement Bd., 402 Mass. 581, 524 N.E. 2d 100 (Mass. 1988). 
314
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Michigan 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 767.5a (LexisNexis 2013) (statute for grand jury proceedings) 
Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 767A.6 (LexisNexis 2013) (statute for investigatory 
subpoenas from prosecutors) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
In re Subpoenas to News Media Practitioners, 240 Mich. App. 369, 613 N.W. 2d 342 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000) 
Marketos v. American Employers Ins. Co., 185 Mich. App 179, 460 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1990) 
In re Contempt of Stone, 154 Mich. App. 121, 397 N.W.2d 244 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) 
Matter of Photo Marketing Ass’n Intern., 120 Mich. App. 527 327 N.W.2d 515 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1982) 
 
Description: 
 
 Michigan’s shield statute provides a qualified privilege in grand jury proceedings 
for journalists to protect informants.
315
 The statute also protects unpublished information 
obtained from or relating to an informant. The statute does not distinguish between 
confidential and non-confidential sources. The shield can be overturned in inquiries of 
crimes with sentences of life imprisonment. In those situations, a court can require a 
journalist to reveal information if it is essential to the proceeding and alternative sources 
have been exhausted.
316
 Michigan also has a statute that protects journalists from 
investigatory subpoenas that prosecutors have issued.
317
 The statute provides an absolute 
privilege for journalists to protect sources in any inquiry using investigative subpoenas. 
Journalists are required to reveal information only if it has been disseminated to the 
public or the journalist is the subject of the inquiry.
318
 A Michigan appellate court has 
applied the grand jury shield statute in civil proceedings. The court found that the statute 
does not provide protection for non-confidential information in such cases. The statute 
protects the identity of the informant as well as communications between a journalist and 
informant.
319
 Michigan appellate courts have refused to find a basis for a journalist’s 
privilege in the First Amendment or state constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
315
 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5A (2013). 
316
Id. 
317
 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767A.6 (2013). 
318
 In re Subpoenas to News Media Practitioners, 240 Mich. App. 369, 613 N.W. 2d 342 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2000). 
319
 Marketos v. American Employers Ins. Co., 185 Mich. App 179, 460 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). 
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Minnesota 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Minn. Stat. § 595.021 – 595.025 (2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
In re Death Investigation of Skjervold, 742 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) 
In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Involving File No. 17139, 720 N.W.2d 807 
(Minn. 2006) 
Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 2003) 
Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 658 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) 
Bauer v. Gannett Co., Inc. (Kare 11), 557 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) 
State v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1996) 
State v. Knutson, 539 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1995) 
State v. Knutson, 523 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1994) 
Heaslip v. Freeman, 511 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) 
State v. Brenner, 488 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) 
State v. Astleford, 323 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. Ct. App. 1982) 
 
Description: 
 
 Minnesota’s shield statute provides a qualified privilege for journalists to protect 
sources and unpublished information gathered during the course of journalistic work.
320
 
The statute includes language that discusses the public policy intent of the statute. The 
statute is intended to protect news media sources and unpublished information.
321
 The 
statute does not distinguish between confidential and non-confidential sources or 
information. The statute also states that the protections apply in courts, grand juries, 
agency hearings and legislative proceedings.
322
 The statute does not specifically define 
who is considered a journalist. The Minnesota Supreme Court did suggest that the 
definition of a journalist can be very broad, though.
323
 A court can overturn the privilege 
if a party can demonstrate all factors under a three-prong test. The first prong requires 
one of two situations. A party must show there is probable cause that the information is 
relevant to a gross misdemeanor or felony. If the information is relevant to only a 
misdemeanor, the party must show that the information will not reveal the identity of the 
source. The second prong requires that the information cannot be obtained through means 
less destructive to First Amendment rights. The third prong requires that the party show a 
compelling and overriding need for the information to prevent injustice.
324
 The 
requirements to overturn the privilege in a defamation case are slightly different. A party 
                                                     
320
 MINN. STAT. § 595.023. 
321
 MINN. STAT. § 595.022.  
322
 MINN. STAT. § 595.023.  
323
 In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Involving File No. 17139, 720 N.W.2d 807, 816 (Minn. 2006). 
324
 MINN. STAT. §595.024.  
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seeking disclosure must show that the identity of the source will lead to evidence of 
actual malice. A journalist will not be required to disclose the source of information 
unless there is probable cause that the source has information relevant to the issue of 
defamation and the information cannot be obtained through alternative means.
325
 The 
Minnesota appellate courts have consistently declined to find a basis for a journalist’s 
privilege in the First Amendment or state constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
325
 MINN. STAT. §595.025. 
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Mississippi 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Mississippi does not have a state shield statute.  
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege. 
 
Description: 
 
 Mississippi has not enacted a state shield statute. The Mississippi state appellate 
courts have not addressed any journalist’s privilege issues. At least one federal district 
court in Mississippi has stated that the First Amendment provides a basis for a qualified 
journalist’s privilege.326 The court held that a journalist can only be required to reveal 
unpublished information after a court balances First Amendment interests of a free press 
against a defendant’s interest in obtaining information.327 Mississippi falls under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit has 
recognized a qualified journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment.328 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
326
 Brinston v. Dunn, 919 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Miss. 1996) 
327
 Id., at 243 
328
 See Mill v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th 
Cir. 1983). 
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Missouri 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Missouri does not have a shield statute.  
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
State ex rel Classics III Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) 
CBS Inc. (KMOX-TV) v. Campbell, 645 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) 
 
Description: 
 
 Missouri does not have a shield statute for journalists. Also, the state appellate 
courts have addressed the issue only twice. In an 1982 case, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals in the eastern district found that a television station could not refuse to disclose 
unpublished information to a grand jury.
329
 The other case that focused on journalist’s 
privilege was in the context of a libel suit against a magazine. The Missouri Court of 
Appeals in the western district held that journalists did have a qualified privilege to 
protect a confidential background source for an allegedly libelous article.
330
 The court 
indicated that the foundation for a privilege could be based on the First Amendment.
331
 
The court adopted a four-part balancing test for media defendants in a libel context. A 
court must balance whether alternative sources have been exhausted, the importance of 
protecting confidentiality under the circumstances, whether the information is crucial to 
the plaintiff’s case, and whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of 
defamation.
332
 The state appellate courts have not stated whether the privilege applies in 
criminal proceedings. The Missouri appellate courts have not defined who is eligible for 
the journalist’s privilege.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
329
 CBS Inc. (KMOX-TV) v. Campbell, 645 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). 
330
 State ex rel Classics III Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
331
 Id., at 653.  
332
 Id., at 655.  
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Montana 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-901 – 26-1-903 (2012) 
  
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
State v. Slavin, 320 Mont. 425, 87 P.3d 495 (Mont. 2004) 
Sible v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 224 Mont. 163, 729 P.2d 1271 (Mont. 1986) 
State ex rel. Adams v. District Court of Third Judicial Dist., 169 Mont. 336, 546 P.2d 988 
(Mont. 1976) 
 
Description: 
 
 Montana’s shield statute provides an absolute privilege for journalists to protect 
any sources or information used during the course of the journalist’s work.333 The statute 
provides protections for journalists working for newspapers, magazines, press 
associations, news agencies, news services, radio stations, television stations or 
community antenna television services.
334
 The shield statute does not provide any 
exceptions in which the privilege can be overturned. The statute also specifically states 
that journalists can waive the privilege only if they voluntarily agree to or voluntarily 
disclose the source during testimony.
335
 This section of the statute was likely amended 
after a court found that a journalist waived the privilege after he simply agreed to provide 
general testimony during a trial.
336
 The Montana appellate courts have not directly 
addressed whether the absolute privilege conflicts with other constitutional rights. In the 
only case touching on the matter, a district trial court dismissed a motion to require 
journalist’s testimony in a criminal proceeding. The defendant stated that the excluded 
testimony harmed his Sixth Amendment and Montana constitutional rights to compel 
witnesses on his behalf. The Montana Supreme Court stated that even if the district court 
had made an error, it was harmless because other testimony could provide similar 
information.
337
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
333
 MONT. CODE ANNO. § 26-1-902.  
334
 Id. 
335
 MONT. CODE ANNO. § 26-1-903. 
336
 Sible v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 224 Mont. 163, 729 P.2d 1271 (Mont. 1986). 
337
 State v. Slavin, 320 Mont. 425, 87 P.3d 495 (Mont. 2004). 
119 
 
 
Nebraska 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-144 – 20-147 (2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege. 
 
Description: 
 
 Nebraska’s shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to protect 
both sources and unpublished information.
338
 The statute provides protection for 
traditional journalists as well as book and pamphlet authors.
339
 The statute states that the 
privilege applies in any judicial, executive, legislative or administrative hearing, or 
investigation.
340
 The statute does not provide any exceptions. Nebraska’s state appellate 
courts have not addressed journalist’s privilege.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
338
 NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-146.  
339
 NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-145(2). 
340
 NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-145(1). 
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Nevada 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49.275 (LexisNexis 2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Diaz v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 116 Nev. 88, 993 P.2d 50 
(Nev. 2000) 
Las Vegas Sun, Inc.  v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and For Clark County, 104 Nev. 
508, 761 P.2d 849 (Nev. 1998) 
Newburn v. Howard Hughes Medical Institute, 95 Nev. 368, 594 P.2d 1146 (Nev. 1979)  
 
Description: 
 
 The Nevada shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to 
protect published and unpublished information as well as sources.
341
 The statute does not 
distinguish between confidential and non-confidential information. The statute provides 
protection from any court, grand jury, coroner’s inquest, legislature, department, agency, 
commission or local governing body proceedings, trials or investigations.
342
 The statute 
limits protections to journalists, former journalists, or editors of newspapers, periodicals 
or press associations. The statute also provides protection to employees of any radio or 
television station.
343
 The Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as providing 
an absolute privilege to journalists.
344
 The court did state, though, that situations might 
exist in which the shield will have to yield to a criminal defendant’s opposing 
constitutional rights.
345
 The Nevada state appellate courts have not specifically had a case 
that addresses such an issue. The state appellate courts have interpreted only the state 
statute as providing a journalist’s privilege rather than the First Amendment or state 
constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
341
 NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 
342
 Id.  
343
 Id. 
344
 Diaz v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 116 Nev. 88, 993 P.2d 50 (Nev. 2000). 
345
 Id., at 101.  
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New Hampshire 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
New Hampshire does not have a state shield statute.  
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc., 160 N.H. 227, 999 
A.2d 184 (N.H. 2010) 
State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1980) 
Downing v. Monitor Pub. Co. Inc., 120 N.H. 383, 415 A.2d 683 (N.H. 1980) 
Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 286, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977) 
 
Description: 
 
 New Hampshire has not enacted a shield statute. The New Hampshire Supreme 
Court has found a basis for a qualified reporter’s privilege to protect confidential sources 
in both the First Amendment and state constitution.
346
 The court has also found that the 
privilege applies in both criminal
347
 and civil proceedings.
348
 The privilege has not been 
determined to extend beyond confidential sources because the supreme court has not 
addressed a case in which other information was at stake. The supreme court has also 
provided protection to newspaper journalists and a website publishing financial news.
349
 
Journalists working for other news media would likely be protected, but no cases have 
addressed the issue. The supreme court has also laid out different tests to overturn the 
privilege depending on the context. In a criminal context, a court can overturn the 
privilege if a defendant can show that all other reasonable means to gain the information 
have been exhausted, the information is not irrelevant to a defense, and a reasonable 
possibility exists that the information would affect the verdict.
350
 In defamation suit, a 
plaintiff must provide evidence that “there is a genuine issue of fact regarding the falsity 
of the publication.”351 In civil suits where the news media is not a party, the court can 
overturn the privilege after conducting a balancing test that weighs the plaintiff’s asserted 
need of information against the free flow of information.
352
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
346
 See  State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 258, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1980). 
347
 Id. 
348
 See Downing v. Monitor Pub. Co. Inc., 120 N.H. 383, 415 A.2d 683 (N.H. 1980); Opinion of the 
Justices, 117 N.H. 286, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977). 
349
 See Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc., 160 N.H. 227, 999 A.2d 184 
(N.H. 2010). 
350
 State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H.,1980). 
351
 Downing v. Monitor Pub. Co. Inc., 120 N.H. 383, 387, 415 A.2d 683 (N.H. 1980) 
352
 Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc., 160 N.H. 227, 236, 999 A.2d 184 
(N.H. 2010). 
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New Jersey 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
N.J. Stat. § 2A:84A-21 – 2A:84A-21.8 (2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209, 20 A.3d 364 (N.J. 2011) 
Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 413 N.J. Super. 135, 993 A.2d 845 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2008) 
Trump v. O’Brien, 403 N.J. Super. 281, 958 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) 
Senna v. Florimont, 196 N.J. 469, 958 A.2d 457 (N.J. 2008) 
In re Venezia, 191 N.J. 259, 922 A.2d 1263 (N.J. 2007) 
Kinsella v. NYT Television, 370 N.J. Super. 311, 851 A.2d 105 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2004) 
Kinsella  v. Welch, 362 N.J. Super. 143, 827 A.2d 325 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000) 
Petition of Burnett, 269 N.J. Super. 493, 635 A.2d 1019 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) 
Gastman v. North Jersey Newspapers Co., 254 N.J. Super. 140, 603 A.2d 111 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) 
State v. Santiago, 250 N.J. Super. 30, 593 A.2d 357 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) 
Matter of Woodhaven Lumber and Mill Work, 123 N.J. 481, 589 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1991) 
In re Schuman, 114 N.J. 14, 552 A.2d 602 (N.J. 1989) 
In re Schuman, 222 N.J. Super. 387, 537 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) 
In re Avila, 206 N.J. Super. 61, 501 A.2d 1018 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) 
Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1982) 
Resorts Intern., Inc. v. NJM Associates, 180 N.J. Super. 459, 435 A.2d 572 (N.J. Super. 
Law Div. 1981) 
Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena of Fawn Vrazo, 176 N.J. Super. 455, 423 A.2d 695 (N.J. 
Super. Law Div. 1980) 
State v. Boiardo, 83 N.J. 350, 416 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1980) 
State v. Boiardo, 82 N.J. 446, 414 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1980) 
Matter of Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (N.J. 1978) 
In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972) 
Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing & Pub. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (N.J. 
Super. Law Div., 1964) 
 
Description: 
 
 The New Jersey Shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to 
protect sources and information.
353
 The statute provides protection for traditional 
journalists as well as information published through “other similar printed, photographic, 
mechanical or electronic means.”354 The New Jersey state appellate courts have found the 
                                                     
353
 N.J. STAT. § 2A:84A-21. 
354
 N.J. STAT. § 2A:84A-21a. 
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privilege extends to book authors,
355
 Internet journalists,
356
 and publishers of an annual 
report rating insurers.
357
 The statute provides protection to journalists in any legal 
proceeding, quasi-legal proceeding, or before an investigative body.
358
  The statute does 
not distinguish between whether the information is confidential and non-confidential. The 
only exceptions the statute makes are for when journalists intentionally conceal their 
identities or are eyewitnesses to an act that involves physical violence or property 
damage.
359
 The New Jersey Supreme Court viewed the exception narrowly when it 
refused to require journalists to provide photographs of a burning building.
360
 The court 
held that journalists could be required to testify only if they personally witness the act 
itself.
361
 The supreme court has held that the absolute privilege could fall when it 
conflicts with a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.362 A court can overturn the 
privilege if a criminal defendant shows that the information was material and relevant, 
unavailable from other sources, and legitimately needed to see and use it.
363
 In 
defamation actions, though, the supreme court held that the shield statute was absolute.
364
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
355
 Trump v. O’Brien, 403 N.J. Super. 281, 958 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
356
 See Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209, 233, 20 A.3d 364, 378 (N.J. 2011). 
357
 Petition of Burnett, 269 N.J. Super. 493, 635 A.2d 1019 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993). 
358
 N.J. STAT. § 2A:84A-21. 
359
 N.J. STAT. § 2A:84A-21a(h). 
360
 Matter of Woodhaven Lumber and Mill Work, 123 N.J. 481, 589 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1991). 
361
 Id., at 488. 
362
 Matter of Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (N.J. 1978). 
363
 Id., at 276-277.  
364
 Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1982). 
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New Mexico 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Rule 11-514 NMRA (2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (N.M. 1982) 
Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976) 
 
Description: 
 
 New Mexico journalists have a qualified testimonial privilege under Rule 11-514 
of New Mexico’s Rules of Evidence.365 The rule states that journalists have a privilege to 
refuse to testify about confidential sources or confidential information obtained in the 
course of journalistic duties.
366
 The rule protects journalists who work for “newspapers, 
magazines, press associations, news agencies wire services, radio or television or other 
similar printed, photographic, mechanical or electronic means of disseminating news to 
the public.”367 Journalists working for Internet news could possibly fall under this 
definition, but no court decision has addressed the issue. A court can overturn the 
privilege if a party can show that a journalist has confidential information that is material 
and relevant, all other sources of gaining the information have been exhausted, the 
information is crucial to the case of the party, and the need of the information outweighs 
the public interest protecting the information and sources.
368
 The source of the shield is in 
the New Mexico rules of evidence because the state supreme court declared the 
legislatively enacted shield statute unconstitutional because the legislature did  not have 
the constitutional power to dictate judicial rules.
369
 The supreme court then promulgated 
a testimonial privilege for journalists into the state’s rules of evidence. The New Mexico 
legislature’s original enactment does remain in the books.370 The New Mexico courts 
have not found a journalist’s privilege in either the First Amendment or state constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
365
 Rule 11-514 NMRA 2013. 
366
 Id., at (B). 
367
 Id., at (A)(6). 
368
 Id., at (C).  
369
 Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976). 
370
 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (2012).  
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New York 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Perito v. Finklestein, 51 A.D.3d 674, 856 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) 
People v. Combest, 4 N.Y.3d 341, 828 N.E.2d 583, 795 N.Y.S.2d 481 (N.Y. 2005) 
Emerson v. Port, 303 A.D.2d 229, 757 N.Y.S.2d 18 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) 
Flynn v. NYP Holdings Inc., 235 A.D.2d 907, 654 N.Y.S.2d 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) 
Application of CBS Inc., 232 A.D.2d 291, 648 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, 228 A.D.2d 187, 643 N.Y.S.2d 92 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1996) 
Application of Codey, 183 A.D.2d 126, 589 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) 
Sands v. News America Pub. Inc., 161 A.D.2d 30, 560 N.Y.S.2d 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1990) 
O’Neill v. Oakgrove Const., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 523 N.E.2d 277, 528 N.Y.S.2d 595 
(N.Y. 1988) 
Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg, 70 N.Y.2d 151, 511 N.E.2d 116, 518 
N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. 1987) 
O’Neill v. Oakgrove Const., Inc., 122 A.D. 2d 570, 505 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1986) 
In re Penzoil Co., 108 A.D.2d 666, 485 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) 
Beach v. Shanley, 63 N.Y.2d 241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y. 1984) 
People v. Korkala, 99 A.D.2d 161, 472 N.Y.S.2d 310 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) 
Oak Beach Inn Corp. v. Babylon Beacon, Inc., 92 A.D.2d 102, 459 N.Y.S.2d 819 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1983) 
Matter of Beach v. Shanley, 94 A.D.2d 542, 466 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) 
Hennigan v. Buffalo Courier Exp. Co., Inc., 85 A.D.2d 924, 466 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1981) 
Greenleigh Associates, Inc. v. New York Post Corp., 79 A.D.2d 588, 434 N.Y.S.2d 388 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980) 
People v. LeGrand, 67 A.D.2d 446, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) 
WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 A.D.2d 5, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) 
People v. Dan, 41 A.D.2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) 
People v. Wolf, 39 A.D.2d 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) 
 
Description: 
 
 The New York shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to 
protect confidential information.
371
 The statute also provides a qualified privilege to 
protect non-confidential news.
372
 The statute provides protection for traditional 
                                                     
371
 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b). 
372
 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c).  
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journalists as well as people working for any “other professional medium or agency.”373 
The New York state appellate courts have stated that the statute extends protection to 
book authors.
374
 A New York trial court has extended the statute to protect Internet 
journalists.
375
 The statute provides journalists with protection in any civil, criminal, grand 
jury or legislative proceedings.
376
 A New York appellate court has held that the statute 
provides protection for journalist’s eyewitness observations.377 A court can overturn the 
privilege for non-confidential information if a party shows that the journalist’s 
information is highly material or relevant, necessary to the maintenance of a claim or 
defense, and is unavailable from other sources.
378
 The statute protects journalists only 
from contempt.
379
   A court could potentially use other sanctions, such as summary 
judgment, in defamation cases. New York Appellate courts have recognized a basis for a 
qualified journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment and state constitution.380 
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 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(6). 
374
 Perito v. Finklestein, 51 A.D.3d 674, 856 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) 
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 Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Eavis, 37 Misc. 3d 1058, 955 N.Y.S.2d 715, 2012  N.Y. Slip Op. 22310 
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 Id.  
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 See O’Neill v. Oakgrove Const., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 523 N.E.2d 277, 528 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. 1988). 
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North Carolina 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.11 (2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
In re Owens, 128 N.C. App. 577, 496 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) 
 
Description: 
 
 The North Carolina shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to 
protect confidential and non-confidential information in any legal proceeding.
381
 The 
statute specifically includes any grand jury proceeding or investigation, criminal 
prosecution or civil suit in its definition of legal proceeding.
382
 The statute states that a 
news medium is any entity that publishes or distributes news through print, broadcast, or 
electronic means.
383
 The definition likely covers journalists working for Internet news 
organizations, but a court has not specifically addressed the issue. To overcome the 
privilege, a party seeking the journalist’s information must establish that the information 
is relevant and material, cannot be obtained through alternative sources, and is essential 
to the maintenance of a claim or defense.
384
 The North Carolina appellate courts have not 
interpreted the shield statute. The only case focusing on a journalist’s privilege occurred 
before the legislature enacted the statute. In that case, the Court of Appeals of North 
Carolina refused to recognize a journalist’s privilege for non-confidential information 
from a non-confidential source.
385
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
381
 N.C. GEN. STAT § 8-53.11(B).  
382
 N.C. GEN. STAT § 8-53.11(A)(2).  
383
 N.C. GEN. STAT § 8-53.11(A)(3).  
384
 N.C. GEN. STAT § 8-53.11(c).  
385
 In re Owens, 128 N.C. App. 577, 496 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998). 
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North Dakota 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
N.D. Cent. Code § 31-01-06.2 (2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Grand Forks Herald v. District Court in and for Grand Forks County, 322 N.W.2d (N.D. 
1982) 
 
Description: 
 
 The North Dakota shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to 
protect sources or any information in any proceeding or hearing.
386
 The statute does not 
distinguish between confidential and non-confidential information. The statute requires 
that the journalists must have gained the information while working. The journalist must 
also be working for or acting for an organization that publishes or broadcasts news. The 
privilege can be overturned if a district court finds that a lack of disclosure will result in a 
miscarriage of justice.
387
 The statute does not specifically explain what a district court 
must consider. In interpreting the statute, the North Dakota Supreme Court provided 
several aspects that a district court must consider. The supreme court factors included 
whether the information was confidential, whether all other possible sources had been 
exhausted, and whether a compelling interest existed. The court stated that the type of 
proceeding should be considered as well as whether the action or suit was patently 
frivolous.
388
 Overall, a district court must balance a variety of factors rather than using a 
uniformly established test. The North Dakota courts have not found a basis for a 
journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment or state constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
386
 N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2013). 
387
 Id. 
388
 Grand Forks Herald v. District Court in and for Grand Forks County, 322 N.W.2d (N.D. 1982). 
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Ohio 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.11 – 2739.12 (LexisNexis 2013) (shield for newspaper 
journalists) 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.04 (LexisNexis 2013) (shield for broadcast journalists) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Svoboda v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 156 Ohio App. 3d 307, 805 N.E.2d 559 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) 
In re April 7, 1999 Grand Jury Proceedings, 140 Ohio App. 3d 755, 749 N.E.2d 325 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000) 
In re Grand Jury Witness Subpoena of Abraham, 92 Ohio App. 3d 186, 634 N.E.2d 667 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993) 
State ex rel. Nat. Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas of Lake County, 52 
Ohio St. 3d 104, 556 N.E.2d 1120 (Ohio 1990) 
State v. Geis, 2 Ohio App. 3d 258, 411 N.E.2d 803 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) 
Matter of McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d 5, 408 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Ohio shield statute grants journalists an absolute privilege to protect the 
identity of sources.
389
 The shield is divided between two different statutes. One statute 
protects newspaper journalists
390
 while the other protects broadcast journalists.
391
 The 
statutes do not distinguish between confidential or non-confidential sources. The statute 
provides protection to journalists in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation.
392
 The 
Ohio state appellate courts have not recognized a journalist’s privilege in the First 
Amendment or state constitution. An Ohio state appellate court has found that the statute 
is limited to only the source of information.
393
  Another state appellate court has 
protected information that could lead to the identity of a source, though.
394
 A state 
appellate court stated that the absolute privilege could fall if it conflicts with a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional rights.395 When the statute and constitutional rights conflict, 
the criminal defendant must show that the journalist’s information can provide relevant 
evidence of guilt or innocence.
396
 
 
 
                                                     
389
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04. 
390
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12. 
391
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04. 
392
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04. 
393
 State v. Geis, 2 Ohio App. 3d 258, 411 N.E.2d 803 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). 
394
 In re April 7, 1999 Grand Jury Proceedings, 140 Ohio App. 3d 755, 749 N.E.2d 325 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2000). 
395
 Matter of McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d 5, 408 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979). 
396
 Id., at 22.  
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Oklahoma 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2506 (2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Taylor v. Miskovsky, 640 P.2d 959 (Okl. 1981) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Oklahoma shield statute provides a qualified privilege for journalists to 
protect both sources and unpublished information in state proceedings.
397
 The statute 
defines state proceedings as any investigation or judicial, legislative, executive or 
administrative proceeding.
398
 The statute protects traditional journalists as well as book 
authors.
399
 The statute does not make a distinction between confidential and non-
confidential sources. The statute also specifically states that the privilege does not apply 
to allegedly defamatory information in proceedings which a defendant asserts a defense 
based on the information.
400
 A court can overturn the privilege if a party establishes that 
the information or source’s identity is relevant to a significant issue and could not be 
discovered through alternative means.
401
 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has found a basis 
for a qualified reporter’s privilege in the First Amendment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
397
 OKL. STAT. tit. 12 § 2506(B).  
398
 OKL. STAT. tit. 12 § 2506(A)(1).  
399
 OKL. STAT. tit. 12 § 2506(A)(2).  
400
 OKL. STAT. tit. 12 § 2506(B).  
401
 OKL. STAT. tit. 12 § 2506(B)(2).  
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Oregon 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 44.510 – 44.530 (2011) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Brown v. Gatti, 195 Or. App. 695, 99 P.3d 299 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) 
State v. Pelham, 136 Or. App. 336, 901 P.2d 972 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) 
State ex rel. Meyers v. Howell, 86 Or. App. 570, 740 P.2d 792 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) 
McNabb v. Oregonian Pub. Co., 69 Or. App. 136, 685 P.2d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) 
State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (Or. 1968) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Oregon shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to 
protect sources and unpublished information.
402
 The statute protects traditional journalists 
as well as book authors.
403
 The statute protects journalists from testifying before any 
executive, legislative, or judicial body.
404
 The statute also prohibits authorities from 
conducting searches of journalists’ papers or work areas unless probable cause exists to 
believe that the journalist has committed or will commit a crime.
405
 The statute does 
provide one exception in the case of defamation actions. Journalists are not allowed to 
withhold the name of a source or information if they are using the information as the 
basis for a defense.
406
 The state appellate courts have interpreted journalist’s privilege 
only through the statute. The Oregon Supreme Court has declined to find a basis in the 
First Amendment for journalist’s privilege.407 A court of appeals stated that the absolute 
privilege can be overcome when it is in conflict with a criminal defendant’s constitutional 
rights of compulsory process.
408
 In such situations, criminal defendants can overcome the 
privilege if they show that the journalist’s information would be both material and 
favorable to a defense.
409
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
402
 OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520. 
403
 OR. REV. STAT. § 44.510(2). 
404
 OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(1). 
405
 OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(2).  
406
 OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(3) 
407
 State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (Or. 1968) 
408
 State ex rel. Meyers v. Howell, 86 Or. App. 570, 740 P.2d 792 (Or. Ct. App. 1987). 
409
 Id., at 578.  
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Pennsylvania 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5942 (2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
In re Dauphin County Fourth Investigating Grand Jury, 610 Pa. 296, 19 A.3d 491 (Pa. 
2011) 
Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 598 Pa. 283, 956 A.2d 937 (Pa. 2008) 
Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 916 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 576 Pa. 151, 838 A.2d 648 (Pa. 2003) 
Commonwealth v. Tyson, 800 A.2d 327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) 
Davis v. Glanton, 705 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) 
McMenamin v. Tartaglione, 139 Pa. Commw. 269, 590 A.2d 802 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) 
Sprague v. Walter, 518 Pa. 425, 543 A.2d 1078 (Pa. 1988) 
Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1987) 
Sprague v. Walter, 357 Pa. Super. 570, 516 A.2d 706 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Pennsylvania shield statute provides journalists with an absolute privilege to 
protect sources.
410
 The statute provides protection for traditional journalists. Journalists 
retain the privilege in any governmental legal proceeding, trial, or investigation.
411
 
Although the statute does not make a distinction between confidential and non-
confidential sources, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined that statutory 
protection applies only to confidential sources.
412
 Pennsylvania state appellate courts 
have recognized a basis in the First Amendment for a qualified journalist’s privilege to 
protect information other than the source.
413
 A court can overturn the privilege if the 
party seeking the information can show that it is material, relevant, and necessary, 
unavailable through other means, and crucial to the case.
414
 The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has not directly ruled whether the First Amendment provides journalists a 
testimonial privilege.
415
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
410
 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942. 
411
 Id. 
412
 Commonwealth v. Bowden, 576 Pa. 151, 838 A.2d 648 (Pa. 2003). 
413
 See McMenamin v. Tartaglione, 139 Pa. Commw. 269, 590 A.2d 802 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); Davis v. 
Glanton, 705 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 
414
 McMenamin ,at 287. 
415
 See Bowden, footnote 10, at 753. 
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Rhode Island 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19.1-2 – 9-19.1-3 (2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Giuliano v. Providence Journal Co., 704 A.2d 220 (R.I. 1997) 
Lett v. Providence Journal Co., 703 A.2d 1125 (R.I. 1997) 
Outlet Communications, Inc. v. State, 588 A.2d 1050 (R.I. 1991) 
Capuano v. Outlet Co., 579 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1990) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Rhode Island shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to 
protect confidential information and sources.
416
 The statute protects journalists working 
for newspapers, periodicals, press associations, newspaper syndicates, wire services, 
radio stations and television stations.
417
 The statute provides protection only when the 
information or source is confidential.
418
 The statute provides protection before any court, 
grand jury, agency, department, or commission.
419
 The statute does provide several 
conditions for the privilege.
420
 The statute does not apply to any information that has 
been made public, in cases in which a defamation defendant asserts a defense based on 
the source of information, or to information about the details of any grand jury or other 
secret proceeding.
421
 A court can overturn the privilege if a party can show that 
disclosure of the source of information is necessary to allow a criminal prosecution of a 
specific felony or to prevent a threat to human life. The party must also show that the 
information is not available from other witnesses.
422
 The Rhode Island Supreme court has 
refused to find a privilege based in the First Amendment or state constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
416
 R.I.  GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2. 
417
 Id. 
418
 Outlet Communications, Inc. v. State, 588 A.2d 1050 (R.I. 1991). 
419
 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2. 
420
 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3.  
421
 Id. 
422
 Id. 
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South Carolina 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-100 (2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
In re Decker, 322 S.C. 215, 471 S.E.2d 462 (S.C., 1995) 
 
Description: 
 
 South Carolina’s shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to 
protect information.
423
 The statute provides protection for traditional journalists as well as 
book authors.
424
 The statute does not distinguish between confidential and non-
confidential information. A court can overturn the privilege if the party seeking 
information can show that the information is material and relevant, unavailable through 
other means, and necessary to the preparation or presentation of the case.
425
 The South 
Carolina appellate courts have not recognized a basis for journalist’s privilege other than 
the statute. In the only case on journalist’s privilege, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
required a journalist to disclose information to a trial court judge.
426
 The supreme court 
stated that the statute only prevented parties in a case from gaining information from 
journalists. The trial court was not a party in the case, so disclosure needed to take 
place.
427
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
423
 S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-100. 
424
 S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-100(A). 
425
 S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-100(B).  
426
 In re Decker, 322 S.C. 215, 471 S.E.2d 462 (S.C., 1995). 
427
 Id., at 463. 
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South Dakota 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
South Dakota does not have a state shield statute. 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broadcasting Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D. 1995) 
 
Description: 
 
 South Dakota has not enacted a state shield statute. The South Dakota state 
appellate courts have considered journalist’s privilege only once.428 At issue in the case 
was whether a television station and journalist needed to disclose the name of a 
confidential source in a libel suit. The South Dakota Supreme Court determined that 
journalists do have a qualified testimonial privilege in civil litigation to protect 
confidential sources.
429
 The supreme court established a five factor test to determine 
when a court could overturn the privilege. The factors included the nature of the 
litigation, the relevancy of the information, the existence of alternative sources, the 
importance of confidentiality, and whether the journalist’s statements were false.430 The 
supreme court stressed that the decision was limited to civil litigation only. The case 
focused on a television journalist. Other traditional journalists would likely have 
protection but the state appellate courts have not discussed the privilege in other contexts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
428
 Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broadcasting Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D. 1995). 
429
 Id., at 782. 
430
 Id. 
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Tennessee 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-208 (2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
State v. Kendrick, 178 S.W.3d 734 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) 
Dingman v. Harvell, 814 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) 
State ex rel. Gerbitz v. Curridan, 738 S.W.2d 192 (Tenn. 1987) 
Austin v. Memphis Pub. Co., 655 S.W.2d 146 (Tenn. 1983) 
Austin v. Memphis Pub. Co., 621 S.W.2d 397 (Ten. Ct. App. 1981) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Tennessee shield statute provides journalists with a qualified privilege to 
protect any information or the source of any information.
431
 The statute’s language 
provides protection for traditional newsgatherers but also protects people who 
independently gather information for publication or broadcast. This language could likely 
protect non-traditional newsgatherers such as Internet media or authors. The Tennessee 
appellate courts have not specifically addressed non-traditional newsgatherers, though. 
The statute does not distinguish between confidential and non-confidential 
information.
432
 A court can overturn the privilege if the person seeking the information 
can show that the journalist has information clearly relevant to a probable violation of 
law, the information is unavailable through other means, and the information is in the 
compelling and overriding interest of the people of Tennessee.
433
 The Tennessee 
appellate courts have interpreted the journalist’s privilege only through the state statute. 
The courts have not found a basis for a journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment or 
state constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
431
 TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208. 
432
 Austin v. Memphis Pub. Co., 655 S.W.2d 146 (Tenn. 1983). 
433
 TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(c).  
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Texas 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 22.021 – 22.027 (2012) (shield in civil proceedings) 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.11 (2012) (shield in criminal proceedings) 
  
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Nelson v. Pagan, 377 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App. 2012) 
In re Rabb, 293 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. App. 2009) 
In re Union Pacific R. Co., 6 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. App. 1999) 
Coleman v. State, 966 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App., 1998) 
Degarmo v. State, 922 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App. 1996) 
Coleman v. State, 915 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App. 1996) 
Dolcefino v. Ray, 902 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App. 1995) 
State ex rel. Healy v. McMeans, 884 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) 
Dallas Morning News Co. v. Garcia, 822 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App. 1991) 
Channel Two Television Co. v. Dickerson, 725 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. App. 1987) 
Ex parte Grothe, 687 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) 
Dallas Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Mouer, 533 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App. 1976) 
 
Description: 
 
 Texas has two shield statutes that differ based on the type of proceeding.
434
 Both 
statutes provide a qualified privilege to journalists. Both statutes grant protection for 
journalists’ sources and unpublished information.435 Both statutes provide protection for 
traditional journalists as well as journalists for Internet media, book authors, and 
academics.
436
 Neither statute distinguishes between confidential and non-confidential 
sources or information. The primary differences between the two statutes are the 
processes for overturning the privilege. In civil proceedings, a court can overturn the 
privilege if a party can show: 1) all reasonable efforts to obtain the information from 
other sources have been exhausted; 2) the subpoenas is not overbroad, unreasonable, or 
oppressive, and limited to the verification and accuracy of published information when 
appropriate; 3) the party gave reasonable and timely notice to journalist of the demand for 
information; 4) the party’s interest of need for information outweighs public interest in 
the gathering and dissemination of news; 5) the subpoena or disclosure is not to obtain 
peripheral, non-essential or speculative information; and 6) the information is relevant 
and material to the administration of the proceeding and is essential to a claim or defense 
of the party desiring the information.
437
 In criminal proceedings, the process to overturn 
the privilege depends on the type of information sought. A court can overturn a 
                                                     
434
 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 22.021 – 22.027 for civil proceedings; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 38.11 for criminal proceedings.  
435
 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 22.023; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART 38.11 § 3. 
436
 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 22.021; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART 38.11 § 1.  
437
 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 22.024.  
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journalist’s privilege to protect confidential sources if a person desiring the testimony can 
show that the journalist’s source committed a felony, confessed or admitted to the 
commission of a felony, or probable cause exists that the source participated in a felony 
criminal offenses. In each instance, the person seeking information must show that 
reasonable efforts to obtain the information from other sources have been exhausted.
438
 A 
court can also require a journalist to disclose information if it finds that the information 
could be reasonably necessary to stop or prevent death or substantial bodily harm. A 
court can overturn a journalist’s privilege to protect non-confidential sources or 
unpublished information if the person seeking information can show that all reasonable 
efforts to obtain information from other sources have been exhausted and the information 
is relevant and material to a claim or defense, or is central to an investigation or 
prosecution.
439
 The statute requires the court to consider multiple factors before 
overturning the privilege.
440
 Finally, some Texas state appellate courts have found a basis 
in the First Amendment for a qualified journalist’s privilege for confidential 
information.
441
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
438
 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART 38.11 § 4.  
439
 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART 38.11 § 5.  
440
 Id. 
441
 See Nelson v. Pagan, 377 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) and Dallas Morning News Co. v. Garcia, 
822 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). 
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Utah 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 509 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege. 
 
Description: 
 
  Utah’s state legislature has not enacted a shield statute. Rather, the Utah Supreme 
Court adopted Rule 509 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which granted a qualified 
journalist’s privilege.442 The privilege provides protection for journalists at newspapers, 
magazines press associations, wire services, television stations or radio stations. The rule 
grants journalists a privilege to protect confidential source information, confidential 
unpublished news information, and other types of unpublished news information. 
Depending on the type of information, the rule also requires courts to apply different 
balancing tests to overturn the privilege. For confidential sources, a court must find that 
the person wishing to overturn the privilege has provided clear and convincing evidence 
that disclosure is necessary to prevent substantial injury or death. For confidential 
unpublished information, a court must find that the person seeking information has 
shown that the need for information outweighs the journalist’s continued interest in the 
free flow of information. Also, journalists have a testimonial privilege for non-
confidential unpublished information if they can demonstrate that the continued need of 
the free flow of information outweighs the need for disclosure.
443
 The Utah state 
appellate courts have not specifically addressed rule 509. The courts have not addressed 
journalist’s privilege generally. Utah falls under the United States Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit Court has used the First Amendment as a basis 
for a qualified journalist’s privilege.444 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
442
 Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 509.  
443
 Id. 
444
 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1997).  
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Vermont  
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Vermont does not have a state shield statute. 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Spooner v. Town of Topsham, 182 Vt. 328, 937 A.2d 641 (Vt. 2007) 
In re Inquest Subpoena (WCAX), 179 Vt. 12, 890 A.2d 1240 (Vt. 2005) 
State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974) 
 
Description: 
 
 Vermont has not enacted a shield statute. The Vermont Supreme Court has used 
the First Amendment as a basis for qualified journalist’s privilege in criminal 
proceedings.
445
 The court granted the privilege to a television reporter, which likely 
means most traditional journalists qualify for the privilege. Other state appellate courts 
have not specifically addressed who is entitled to the privilege, though. The supreme 
court has placed limits on the situations in which a journalist is entitled to First 
Amendment protections.
446
 Specifically, the court refused to recognize a journalist 
privilege in an inquest, which is equivalent to grand jury proceedings.
447
 The state 
appellate courts have not addressed whether the privilege would apply in a civil context. 
The supreme court specifically refused to provide protection for a journalist’s personal 
observations at a public hearing.
448
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
445
 State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974). 
446
 See In re Inquest Subpoena (WCAX), 179 Vt. 12, 18, 890 A.2d 1240, 1244 (Vt. 2005) interpreting State 
v. St. Peter.  
447
 Id. 
448
 Spooner v. Town of Topsham, 182 Vt. 328, 937 A.2d 641 (Vt. 2007). 
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Virginia 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Virginia does not have a state shield statute.  
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974) 
 
Description: 
 
 Virginia has not enacted a state shield statute. The Virginia state appellate courts 
have addressed journalist’s privilege only once. The Virginia Supreme Court found a 
basis in the First Amendment for a qualified journalist’s privilege to protect confidential 
sources in criminal proceedings.
449
 The court provided a privilege to a newspaper 
journalist, so other traditional journalists would likely receive protection. The supreme 
court stated that a court should overturn the privilege if the journalist’s information was 
essential for a trial to be fair. A court must examine the facts and circumstances of each 
case to decide whether the information is essential.
450
 The state appellate courts have not 
considered the privilege in other contexts. Some Virginia trial courts have considered the 
privilege in a civil context, though.
451
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
449
 Brown v. Com., 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974). 
450
 Id., at 431.  
451
 See Philip Morris Companies, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 36 Va. Cir. 1 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. 1995); Clemente v. Clemente, 56 Va. Cir. 530 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2001). 
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Washington 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.68.010 (LexisNexis 2013) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Olsen v. Allen, 42 Wash. App. 417, 710 P.2d 822 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) 
State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wash. 2d 749, 689 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1984) 
State v. Rinaldo, 36 Wash. App. 86, 673 P.2d 614 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) 
Clampitt v. Thurston County, 98 Wash. 2d 638, 658 P.2d 641 (Wash. 1983) 
Senear v. Daily Journal-American, a Division of Longview Pub. Co., 97 Wash. 2d 148, 
641 P.2d 1180 (Wash. 1982) 
Senear v. Daily Journal American, 27 Wash. App. 454, 618 P.2d 536 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1980) 
 
Description: 
 
 The Washington shield statute provides a qualified protection for journalists to 
protect sources and information.
452
 Besides protecting traditional journalists, the statute 
provides protection for book authors and journalists working for Internet-only news 
media.
453
 The statute appears to apply to both confidential and non-confidential 
information.
454
 The statute provides a two-step process for a court to overturn the 
privilege. In a criminal investigation or prosecution, a party must first show through other 
sources that reasonable grounds exist to believe that a crime has occurred. In a civil 
action, a party must show a prima face cause of action through other sources of 
information. A court can overturn the privilege in either a criminal or civil proceeding if a 
party shows that the information is highly material and relevant, the information is 
critical or necessary to the maintenance of a claim, defense or material issue, all other 
sources have been exhausted, and compelling public interesting in disclosure exists.
455
 
Washington state appellate courts have not interpreted the statute since it was enacted. 
Prior to the statute, the Washington Supreme Court had recognized a common law 
privilege in both criminal
456
 and civil contexts.
457
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 WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010(1).  
453
 WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010(5)(A).  
454
 WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010(1).  
455
 WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010(2).  
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 State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wash. 2d 749, 689 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1984). 
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 Senear v. Daily Journal-American, a Division of Longview Pub. Co., 97 Wash. 2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 
(Wash. 1982). 
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West Virginia 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
W. Va. Code Ann. § 57-3-10 (LexisNexis 2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
State ex rel. Lincoln Journal, Inc. v. Hustead, 228 W. Va. 17, 716 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 
2011) 
State ex rel. Charleston Mail Ass’n v. Ransom, 200 W. Va. 5, 488 S.E.2d 5, (W. Va. 
1997) 
State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 182 W. Va. 500, 389 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va. 1989) 
 
Description: 
 
 The West Virginia shield statute provides a near-absolute privilege for journalists 
to protect confidential sources of information.
458
 The statute provides journalists 
protection in any civil, criminal, administrative or grand jury proceeding in a court.
459
 
The statute also protects any information that could possibly identify a confidential 
source.
460
 The protection is near-absolute because court can require testimony only if the 
journalist’s information is necessary to prevent imminent death, serious bodily injury, or 
unjust incarceration.
461
 The statute has a broad definition of who is a journalist but does 
require that journalism work make up a substantial portion of the person’s livelihood. The 
statute does protect student journalists even if they are not compensated.
462
 In addition to 
the statute, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has found the basis for a 
qualified journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment and state constitution.463 The court 
stated that the privilege applies to both sources and information whether confidential or 
non-confidential.
464
 A court could overturn the privilege only after a party seeking the 
information shows that the information is highly material and relevant, necessary or 
critical to a claim, and unavailable from other sources.
465
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
458
 W. VA. CODE § 57-3-10(B). 
459
 W. VA. CODE § 57-3-10(B)(1). 
460
 W. VA. CODE § 57-3-10(B)(2). 
461
 W. VA. CODE § 57-3-10(B). 
462
 W. VA. CODE § 57-3-10(A).  
463
 State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 182 W. Va. 500, 389 S.E.2d 188 (W.Va. 1989). 
464
 Id., at 504.  
465
 Id., at 505.  
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Wisconsin 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Wis. Stat. § 885.14 (2012) 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
Kurzynski v. Spaeth, 196 Wis. 2d 182, 538 N.W.2d 554 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) 
State ex rel Green Bay Newspaper Co. v. Circuit Court, Branch 1, Brown County, 113 
Wis. 2d 411, N.W.2d 367 (Wis. 1983) 
Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1978) 
State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (Wis. 1971) 
 
Description: 
 
 Wisconsin’s state shield statute provides an absolute privilege for journalists to 
protect confidential sources and information.
466
 The statute also provides a qualified 
privilege for journalists to protect non-confidential information.
467
 The privilege provides 
protection for traditional news gatherers as well as book authors.
468
 The statute also 
grants the privilege to a person who works for a business or organization that publishes 
electronically.
469
 This language would likely protect Internet news media, but the 
Wisconsin state appellate courts have not specifically addressed the issue. A circuit court 
can issue a subpoena that requires a journalist to reveal non-confidential sources after 
multiple steps. In a criminal prosecution or investigation, the person seeking information 
must show that reasonable grounds exist to believe that a crime has been committed.
470
 In 
a civil procedure, the person must show that the complaint states a claim which the 
information could provide relief.
471
 A circuit court can issue a subpoena if it finds that the 
requested information is highly relevant, necessary to the maintenance of a claim, defense 
or issue, unavailable through other means, and disclosure is in the overriding public 
interest.
472
 Before the statute was enacted, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the basis 
for a qualified journalist’s privilege in the state constitution473 and in the First 
Amendment for civil actions.
474
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
466
 WIS. STAT. § 885.14(2). 
467
 WIS. STAT. § 885.14(2)(b).  
468
 WIS. STAT. § 885.14(1). 
469
 Id. 
470
 WIS. STAT. § 885.14(2)(b)(1). 
471
 WIS. STAT. § 885.14(2)(b)(2) 
472
 WIS. STAT. § 885.14(2)(c). 
473
 Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1978). 
474
 Kurzynski v. Spaeth, 196 Wis. 2d 182, 538 N.W.2d 554 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
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Wyoming 
 
State Shield Statute: 
 
Wyoming does not have a state shield statute. 
 
State Cases Analyzed: 
 
No state appellate courts have addressed journalist’s privilege. 
 
Description: 
 
 Wyoming does not have a state shield statute. The state appellate courts have not 
addressed whether a journalist’s privilege exists under the First Amendment, state 
constitution or common law. Wyoming falls under the United States Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals’ jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit Court has recognized a qualified journalist’s 
privilege in the First Amendment.
475
 Journalists could potentially look to that court’s 
decision as a basis for protection. 
 
                                                     
475
 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1997).  
